Gender, Migration, Work and Care Deficits: What Role is there for the SDGs?

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1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations.
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Introduction

This Background Paper explores migration to higher income countries in light of collective commitments to the Social Development Goals (SDGs) and argues that domestic social protection and labour market policy will need to be modified to meet these commitments. The paper contributes to the deliberations of the Expert Group Meeting (EGM) on the priority theme of the sixty-first session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW61): “Women’s economic empowerment in the changing world of work.” The paper will also contribute to the priority theme report, which UN Women prepares on behalf of the Secretary General and which will be discussed during the ministerial segment of CSW.

The paper focuses on gender, migration and work, with a particular emphasis on migrant women in care work. We examine the context and situation of migrant women workers in the top twenty labour importing countries in the 21st century. We look primarily at women in care work, using a broad definition of care that includes home help, domestic work, and health care. We argue that the failure to recognize and value unpaid care work has created a sustained labour demand for women migrant care workers in many of these labour importing countries. Aging in late industrial and middle income economies, combined with rising demographic dependency ratios and female labour force participation have led to emerging care deficits in many contexts. As more women enter the labour force in labour importing countries, they are less able and have less time to fulfil traditional unpaid caring roles. Increasingly, immigrant women are being imported into host economies to care, often in informal settings, and frequently engaged by private households, without full access to social protection and labour rights. Simultaneously, the failure to generate sufficient jobs and quality jobs in home countries has led to a potential surplus of labour, fuelling migration abroad. This deficit of decent work is particularly acute for women who disproportionately concentrate in informal employment or who are more likely to be under- and unemployed in home countries. The combined push- and pull-factors lead to a rising proportion of female migrant workers in host countries, many of whom are engaged in care work.

In this context, the consistent application of SDG goals 5 and 8 and their linking to existing labour rights norms and conventions could simultaneously address both care deficits and protect the rights of care workers in labour importing countries. The role of the UN in ensuring that the SDG targets and goals are explicitly linked to labour rights norms and conventions will be central in ensuring that the terms and conditions of employment in care work are addressed in host countries and in ensuring that migrant workers are able to claim these rights. Moreover, commitments to both of these goals can reduce the push-factors that lead women to migrate and minimize the burden of unpaid care work in migrant sending countries.

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3 These countries are listed in Annex 1.
Women, Work and Migration

Across countries and regions, significant gender gaps exist in women’s and men’s participation rates, with women typically reporting lower levels of participation in paid employment. Moreover, we observe pronounced sex-segmentation in many labour markets, with women clustering in a narrower range of lower paying occupations. Nearly one fourth of women globally are defined as unpaid contributing family workers, meaning that they receive no direct pay for their efforts, and there is a pronounced segregation of women into lower paying sectors and informal employment. Globally, the gender pay gap is estimated to be 22.9 per cent which means that on average women earn 77.1 per cent of what men earn. Furthermore, the returns to potential experience (years since leaving full-time education) are lower for women than men and the pay gap for women who are married with children is generally larger (ILO 2016a; UN Women 2015).

To understand the unequal position of women in the labour market requires that we first have to understand the sexual division of labour in the household and women’s disproportionate engagement in unpaid household work. Around the world, a large body of literature has shown that men tend to specialize in market work while women specialize in unpaid work in the household (Benería, Berik and Floro 2016; Gammage 2015; UN Women 2015). Much of the unpaid household work is devoted to caring for household members and household provisioning such as cooking, cleaning, washing, mending and making clothes. Caring work takes up a significant amount of time, especially in those countries where infrastructure is poor and publicly provided caring services are limited. Where women are disproportionately engaged in caring work and the time invested in caring is high, they have less time available for market work. Moreover, when they engage in market work, they typically have to balance the imperative of earning an income against that of caring for household members. As a result, they frequently find themselves in lower paid, irregular, own account and informal work, working fewer hours and earning lower incomes.

Gender norms and stereotypes shape women’s and men’s roles and responsibilities and underpin decisions about whether to work in the market, whether to invest in education and skills, and what type of work to engage in. Where women engage in market work, they often concentrate in sectors and occupations closely related to their caring roles in the household. As a result, we observe a marked horizontal and vertical sex segmentation in labour markets where women and men concentrate in different sectors, job types and categories. Where work is feminized the returns to education and employment are often lower. Highly feminized occupations tend to command lower wages contributing to overall gender wage gaps and distorting incentives to invest in women’s labour. Nearly one fourth of women globally are defined as unpaid contributing family workers, meaning they receive no direct pay for their efforts, and there is a pronounced segregation of women into lower paying sectors and informal employment (ILO 2016a; Benería, Berik and Floro 2016; Heintz 2012). Across the globe fewer women work in paid employment, and when they work, they tend to cluster in informal employment, earning lower wages and labouring under precarious conditions (Heintz 2012; Seguino 2016).
Concerns about the terms and conditions of employment for women and their lack of access to Decent Work\(^4\) are also pervasive (Balakrishnan et al 2016; Berik and van der Meulen Rodgers 2010). Continued violations of women’s rights in the labour market include the dismissal of pregnant women and women with young children as well as sexual harassment. Women working in the informal economy are at a higher risk of exploitation than those in formal employment and experience frequent violation of their rights. These women are largely unprotected by labour legislation and lack access to social protection. Also, there is a significant gap between law and practice as illustrated by the number of pregnant women who still lose their jobs and the number of complaints of maternity-related dismissals (Human rights Watch 2015).

In this context, migration can be seen as one response to the lack of decent work in home countries. As the numbers of migrant workers rise to over 150 million (ILO 2015), this can only be seen as a part of a collective failure to ensure entitlements to decent work at home. Looking at the specific situation of female migrants who now number about 67 million (ibid) and examining where they migrate to and from for work also affords the opportunity to consider this failure against the backdrop of collective commitments to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals.

**Migration and the SDGs**

The current formulation of the SDGs and their targets contains a stand-alone goal on gender equality, Goal 5, and multiple other goals where attention to gender will enable governments to meet their commitments to reduce entrenched global inequalities and contribute to human development. There are some of these goals and targets which have particular relevance for labour importing and labour sending countries. This paper highlights three of these targets, 5.4, 8.5 and 8.8, where higher income, labour importing and labour sending countries need to pay particular attention to the gendered nature of migration and the terms and conditions of employment for women migrants in order to uphold these commitments effectively.

The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (2015:4) maintains that: “The goals will chart out a universal, holistic framework to help set the world on a path towards sustainable development, by addressing all three dimensions of economic development, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability.” Indeed, as Razavi (2016) observes citing Saith (2006:1184): “The 2030 Agenda’s universal applicability means that it is not merely ‘‘our agenda’ for ‘them.’” Rather, it is a global template fit for a world that is increasingly integrated through flows of finance and people, in which poverty, deprivation, inequality (including gender inequality), and unsustainable patterns of production and consumption, are as much of a concern in the rich advanced economies as they are in the developing world. Yet there is a notable dearth of  

\(^4\) Here we are referring to the ILO definition of Decent Work. See http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm
literature on the eventual application of the SDGs in developed countries within their national boundaries.

Among the few analyses of the SDGs in developed contexts, a notable exception is the work of Osborn, Cutter and Ullah (2015). As these authors (2015:3) point out: “All of the SDGs are relevant and apply in general terms to all countries including developed countries. However, the nature and balance of the challenges they represent will be different in different national contexts.” These authors examine the SDGs from the perspective of their universality looking at Europe and the higher income OECD countries and identify which developed countries are likely to face the greatest challenges implementing and adhering to these commitments within their national borders. They conclude, in the case of the goals we have identified in this article, that both goal 5 on gender equality and goal 8 on decent work require far greater attention to ensure their achievement.

Among the goals and targets that we consider in this paper are those of Goal 5.4 to “recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate.” This goal is acutely relevant to all governments where entrenched gender inequalities in the distribution and use of time mean that women tend to specialize in caregiving while men tend to specialize in paid work (Gammage 2015; Folbre 2002). This goal is particularly relevant not only for the host countries where migrants densely populate care work and the care sector, but also for the home countries which face a burgeoning care deficit as women are exported to care.

The failure to recognize and value unpaid care is at the root of a “care deficit” and what has been termed a “care crisis” in many high and middle income economies (Samman et al. 2016). These are not hollow words; the failure to recognize the intimate subsidy of care to market economies is what has led it to be both invisible and undervalued (Folbre 2012, 2002, 1995; Pichio 2006).

The devaluation of care is closely linked to the fact that it has been rendered unpaid, and unrecognized for generations (Himmelweit 1999, 2002, 2007; Folbre 1995). As Tronto (2007:39) observes: “we all receive and provide care at some stage of our lives, as being vulnerable is part of our condition as human beings”. Caring work is something that is performed for free, often out of love and is seen as a naturalized extension of the role women have in society. Because it apparently requires no skills and anyone can do it, care work commands little value in our societies. Even when this care work is outsourced and carers are hired-in, it frequently occupies that blurry terrain between formal and informal work, and since much of the service rendered is affective, it is easy for the cared-for and sometimes for the carers to devalue this work.

Moreover, where society places little value on this work, and offers few opportunities to access formal and quality care services or recognize the skills and professional status of carers, wages in caring work are frequently low and hours long. Howes, Leana, and Smith (2012) draw attention to this in their analysis of care work in the United States. Because care workers perform services
that traditionally women have provided in the home for free, they are often not seen as workers who are making a significant contribution to the economy and deserve decent compensation.

Devalued and largely invisible, care work has become an expanding sector for migrant workers worldwide (Amrith 2015; Beneria, Deere and Kabeer 2012; Michel and Peng 2012; Triandafyllidou 2011; Williams 2010; Yeates 2010). The ILO (2015c) estimates that there are over 150 migrant workers worldwide and that of these, approximately 11.5 million are migrant domestic workers labouring in private homes. As the OECD (2011) report “Help wanted” underscores, migrants accounted for 47% of the increase in the workforce in the United States and 70% in Europe over the past ten years. The same report estimates that in Australia, foreign born workers make up more than 25% of all care workers, in Austria and Israel this figure rises to 50% and in Italy to 72%. The majority of these occupations where migrants cluster is feminized and the greatest number of these foreign born workers are women. Many of these foreign born workers flow into care work in private households, caring for the young, aged and infirm or in the burgeoning health sector. This has been fuelled by the increasing commodification of health care in combination with population aging, is creating a rising demand for care services. Moreover, this is occurring in a global context where there is a ‘crisis in human resources’ in the health sector, which has been described as one of the most pressing global health issues of our time. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that the world faces a global shortage of almost 4.3 million doctors, midwives, nurses, and other healthcare professionals (WHO 2006; 2010).

While SDG 5 is relevant for migrant women workers, and particularly 5.4, so are those goals and targets in SDG 8, most notably SDG 8.5 which commits to “Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value.” This applies with particular urgency to women migrants and those working in the care economy. But it also applies to the collapse of entitlement to decent work in labour-sending countries which contributes to out-migration. Similarly, SDG 8.8 calls for states “To protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment.” Here explicit reference is even made to women migrants and those in precarious employment.

Using the SDG framework in host and home countries affords the potential to address some of the specific collapse of entitlement to rights that migrant women workers face. Moreover, where these goals and targets are explicitly linked to existing norms and conventions there is the potential for claims-making by migrant women workers and their allies to protect the terms and conditions of employment and uphold their human and labour rights.

Addressing the challenges of accountability, as well as, ensuring plural fora for civil society, unions and other collectives to interrogate and challenge national governments and host and home country government’s commitments and achievements within the SDG framework will be critical. Esquivel (2016:13) reinforces this need when she discusses the High Level Political
Forum that will review the SDG goals and targets, noting that: “the high-level political forum is, however, based on voluntary country-level reviews, without any universal mechanism to assess each country’s contribution to the global realisation of these goals.” Moreover, citing Bissio (2014), she points out that this forum has no ability to review and monitor the multiple multilateral agencies, Bretton Woods Institutions and corporations or “partnerships” publicly committing to support the SDG process. Linking the goals and targets to existing human rights instruments and treaty bodies can potentially offer another forum for oversight and contestation. Ensuring that explicit mention is made in national development plans and agendas also provides additional traction for civil society to oversee and name and shame those governments falling behind on their commitments.

Yet as Adams and Tobin (2014:24) remind us, CSOs have neither the mandate nor the means to close the accountability gap. This rests with democratically accountable national and sub-national legislatures, which should strengthen their interest in and oversight of their executive branch in regional and global policy fora.”

Gender, Migration and Macro Processes
This section of the background paper analyses those push and pull factors that lead to women’s out-migration, looking at the change in the female migrant stock in the top twenty labour importing countries between 2000 and 2015. We also examine labour market conditions, poverty rates and potential income gains achieved through migration from the migrant-sending countries providing the greatest transfer of labour to these top twenty labour importing countries. The data are drawn from publicly available databases such as the World Development Indicators, ILOSTAT, Global Extension of Social Security database, and KILM, as well as from publications such as the ILO’s Women at Work (2016), the 2012 and 2013 World Development Reports, the World Bank World Development Indicators, the World Bank Migration and Remittances data, UN DESA Trends in International Migration Stock, the labor rights in law and practice database from Penn State University, the OECD SIGI database, and UN Women’s Progress of the World’s Women 2015-2016.

These data are used to describe how the lack of entitlement to work and to decent work for women in home countries is part of the impetus for their migration. We will also highlight that despite slightly greater probabilities of finding work and earning more, migrants’ labor rights are not necessarily upheld in host countries. We will look at where women are migrating to and whether they are migrating into countries with greater or lesser labor rights. Potential access to decent work in home and host countries are captured by variables that describe labor rights in law and practice, signatories to key labor conventions, the extent of vulnerable employment, and social protection expenditures.

The data reveal some interesting correlations between women’s labour force participation and the change in the stock of migrants over time. These correlations uphold the view that much of the demand for migrants is concentrated in sectors that replace or commodify care work enabling
native-born women to find employment outside the home. Yet it is important to note that not all those who replace native women workers, or enter caring occupations, are women; men also enter care work and engage in other types of service-sector work that replaces household reproduction. Figure 1 shows the correlation between the percentage change in female labour force participation from 2000-2014 using OECD and World Development Indicators data and the percentage change in the total stock of migrants from 2000-2015, using UN data\(^1\) for the top twenty labour importing countries in the world (see Annex 1 for list of top twenty labour importing countries). The percentage change in female labour force participation is positively related to the percentage change in the stock of migrants in the top twenty labour importing countries (R=0.34). This would seem to imply that both male and female migrant labour is demanded as female labour force participation rises in the host country. The same is also true when we graph the percentage change in the labour force participation of women against the percentage change in the stock of female migrants (R=0.53). This would suggest that although both male and female migrants can substitute for household and caring labour, or compensate for any redistribution in that labour between men and women, female migrant labour may be a closer substitute for native-born female carers and workers.\(^{ii}\)

Figure 1. Percentage Change in the Labour Force Participation of Women and the Change in the Stock of Migrants in the Top Twenty Labour Importing Countries (2000-2014)

Figure 2, below charts the percentage of the population over 60 and the change in the proportion of female migrants in the top twenty labour importing countries. This measure attempts to capture how the migrant population may have become feminized in response to a need for greater caring labour, particularly in aging societies. The increase in the stock of female migrants
has led to a greater proportion of female migrants in the total migrant population in some of the labour importing countries. The population data for aging are from UN DESA.iii The percentage of the population over 60 is positively related to the percentage change in the proportion of female migrants in the top twenty labour importing countries (R=0.36). This would imply that the proportion of female migrants has changed most in those countries with a larger proportion of elderly. Similarly the correlation between the increase in the proportion of female migrants and the demographic dependency ratio is R=0.38 (see Annex 1 Figure 2).

Figure 2. Percentage of the Population over 60 and the Change in the Proportion of Female Migrants in the Top Twenty Labour Importing Countries (2000-2014)

To what extent are women migrants entering countries where their labour rights are limited by their migration status? Figure 3 below graphs the change in the proportion of female migrants over time against an index of labour law and rights in practice from the Center for Global Workers Rightsiv at Penn State University. This database provides information on country-level compliance with some key labour laws and rights including, freedom of association and collective bargaining rights and violations and is compiled using data from the ILO Reports of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, the International Trade Union Confederation Survey of violations of Trade Union Rights and the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The data are comparable between countries and over time (Kucera and Sari 2016).v A higher score means lower levels of labour rights in both law and practice and a greater number of labour rights violations. What Figure 3 clearly shows is that there is a negative relationship between change in
the proportion of female migrants and the overall score for labour rights in law and practice in the top ten labour importing countries. The correlation between these variables is \( (R=-0.35) \). Interestingly, the equivalent correlation for the total stock of migrants is \( (R=-0.02) \) indicating that those countries where there has been a greater change in the percentage of the stock of female migrants are those experiencing and reporting fewer labour rights violations. While this should give cause for cautious optimism, the dotted red lines in Figure 3 indicate the average scores for labour rights in law and practice and the average change in the proportion of female migrants in these twenty countries. Countries least likely to apply labour rights in law and practice in our sample, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Turkey\(^{vi}\), are experiencing declines in the proportion of female migrants. Yet the upper right hand quadrant identifies five countries where the failure to apply labour rights law in practice is also associated with an above average increase in the feminization of the migrant pool. These countries are Thailand, Pakistan, India, Russia and the United States. Clearly, increasing the de jure rights available to be claimed by workers and particularly migrant workers and expanding their access to justice mechanisms in these countries should be a priority.

Figure 3. Change in the Proportion of Female Migrants and the Overall Score of Labour Rights in Law and Practice

![Figure 3](source: UN DESA and the Center for Global Labor Rights, Pennsylvania State University)

Looking at the relationship between certain macro and meso indicators in labour importing and labour sending countries will also tell us more about the conditions that may lead to greater out-
migration. For this analysis, labour sending countries are matched to labour importing countries in dyads, the host country is linked to the sending country by the greatest number of immigrants from the source country. In some cases, several host countries may have the same sending country sources. For example, this is true for India, a country that sends migrant labour to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. When we consider these dyads, not surprisingly GDP per capita is higher in 18 of the top twenty labour importing countries, which would indicate that on average, if an individual is able to migrate, her/his potential to earn more than in the home country is greater in host countries (see Figure 3, Annex 1). How does this translate to poverty rates? The data are less consistent and spottier, but we observe that headcount poverty rates reported are also lower in host than in home countries. Of the 12 countries for which we have poverty rates in both home and host countries, we find that poverty rates are lower in 9 of these countries (see Figure 4, Annex 1). The same is also true of measures of inequality, the GINI coefficient is lower in 8 host countries of the 11 countries for which we have data for both home and host countries (see Figure 3, Annex 1).

What this means for women migrants can be seen in some of the indicators of women’s employment and earnings. Figure 4 reveals that in the top twenty labour importing countries fewer women are likely to be found in agricultural employment. Of the 14 countries for which we have data on home and host countries, women are less likely to work in agriculture in 10 of them. This reveals that many migrants are migrating from more rural to more service-oriented economies, but also tells us about the lower potential likelihood of working in physically demanding employment that is less likely to be covered by social protection.

**Figure 4.** Percent of Women in Agricultural Employment in Home and Host Country

![Figure 4](image-url)

*Source: KILM 9th Edition*
Unfortunately, when we try and proxy the potential availability of formal or decent work for women migrants by data on work in waged and salaried employment, vulnerable employment, and labour rights law in practice, the lack of data complicates our analysis. Overall, it appears that women are moving into host countries where the potential for their employment in more stable, secure and less precarious employment is higher. This conclusion must be tempered by the fact that we are dealing with averages that aggregate migrants and non-migrants and that we have no micro data that would allow us to see how occupational segmentation and segregation by sex and migrant status interact to reduce the probability of finding decent work.

Figure 5 reveals that of the 12 countries for which we have data on home and host dyads, the percentage of women in waged and salaried employment is higher in 9 of the host countries. This would appear to indicate that the probability of finding wage and salaried work would increase for women in host as compared with home countries. Since wage and salaried work has the potential to be more stable and may be more likely to be formal work, this could indicate a potential improvement in working conditions and opportunities through migration.

Figure 5. Percentage of Women in Wage and Salaried Employment in Host and Home Countries

Source: KILM 9th Edition

Similarly, Figure 6 reveals that in 6 of the 9 countries for which we have data, a lower proportion of women are defined as being in vulnerable employment in host countries. Vulnerable employment is defined as the sum of the employment status groups of own-account workers and contributing family workers. These workers are less likely to have formal work arrangements, and are therefore more likely to lack decent working conditions (ILO KILM 2013). The three
countries where the percent of women in vulnerable employment rises are the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Turkey.

Figure 6. Percentage of Women in Vulnerable Employment in Host and Home Countries

![Graph showing the percentage of women in vulnerable employment in host and home countries.]

Source: KILM 9th Edition

One key dimension of decent work is captured in the right to organize. Worldwide, the data are spotty, but the ILO does collect data on union density and collective bargaining across a number of countries. The data in Figure 7, show union density rates, that is the percentage of total employed reporting that they are members of a union, for the home and host country dyads. These data are mostly collected from Labour Force and Household Surveys. Unfortunately, we do not have these data disaggregated by sex. We can say, however, that for the ten countries for which we have data on union density, 60% of these report higher rates of union density in host as compared to home countries. This may indicate a greater propensity to defend the rights of workers in the workplace. We cannot say whether these unions represent women and migrants.

Figure 7. Percentage of Total Employed in Unions in Host and Home Countries
Finally, in light of the previous data, how do measures of labour rights vary in the home and host countries? Although the GLU labour rights index is sex disaggregated, it does tell us about the labour rights environment in home and host countries. In 12 of the 19 countries for which we have data, labour rights are recorded to be better in host countries. The 7 countries where labour rights in practice appear to deteriorate are Australia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and the United States. In some cases this reflects the particular dyad of home and host countries, for instance the primary source country for Australia is the United Kingdom. India is the primary source country for migrants in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while Ukraine is the primary source for Russia and Myanmar for Thailand.

Figure 8. Labour Rights in Home and Host Countries

Source: The Center for Global Labor Rights, Pennsylvania State University
The failure to uphold labour rights in the home countries may be a significant part of the impetus to seek work abroad. But we must remember that the de jure existence of rights in both contexts does not necessarily translate to their de facto application. There is consistent evidence that migrants, particularly but not exclusively undocumented migrants, face more contingent access to a more circumscribed set of de jure and de facto rights. This is acutely visible in the analysis of the precarious nature of care work by migrant domestic workers in host countries. As the UN Secretary General’s Report on Violence Against Women Migrant Workers (2015) makes abundantly clear, many of those imported to care find themselves in precarious and contingent employment in the host country with limited rights and recourse to justice.

Women who perform domestic work are particularly vulnerable to abuse because of the unequal power relations they face while engaging with labour brokers and employers, and because they have limited access to information and their autonomous movement outside private homes is restricted in many receiving countries. Up-front recruitment costs are commonly passed on to the employer, who can withhold payment of wages until they consider that the full debt is repaid, which effectively creates debt bondage employment. Care workers routinely face serious human rights abuses owing to the invisible nature of their workplace. Those abuses frequently include physical, psychological and sexual violence, forced labour, salary that is withheld or not paid at all, excessively long hours, no guaranteed weekly day of rest, limited access to health services, lack of freedom of movement and withdrawal of personal belongings. They are also often excluded from labour legislation and social protection, including, inter alia, in relation to their freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (UN 2015:4).

In 2014, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Francois Crepeau, reported on migrant labour exploitation. He drew attention to a poignant case of a migrant domestic worker, reportedly aged 17 although her passport stated that she was older who was brought to work in one of the Gulf States and was later charged with murder for the death of a baby in her care, and ultimately executed by beheading (UN General Assembly 2014). Although this case is particularly dramatic, there are many similar ones in which migrant women workers imported to care find themselves working without labour protections and recourse to justice mechanisms. Indeed, there has been an extensive scholarship on migrant women workers, particularly those in domestic service and the exploitative working conditions to which they are subject (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007; Varia 2006 2014; Anderson and Shutes 2014; England and Henry 2013; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003).
Women Migrants, Occupational Segregation and Care Work

Because we have no consistent country datasets that would allow us to explore migrant women’s access to decent work over time, we appeal to existing micro data and case studies to explore aspects of migrant women’s entitlement to decent work in host countries, particularly in the care sector. This section of the report reviews the evidence on the occupational segregation of migrant women in host countries and their disproportionate concentration in more informal work and particularly in care work, including home care, and health care.

In this section, we provide some description of the terms and conditions of care work in several of the top twenty host countries. We draw heavily on existing case studies as comparable data are sparse. Through this analysis, we attempt to examine the effects of gender inequalities and the degree to which migrant status reinforces migrant women’s vulnerability in the labour market. To do so, we choose case studies that describe workers’ de facto entitlements to labour rights and protections in care work. In the subsequent section we also consider those left behind and how migration contributes to shifting care burdens in contexts where States do not recognize, reduce or redistribute care work.

There is a large body of literature that attests to the fact that immigrant workers typically face higher probabilities of working in the informal economy and in contingent and precarious work in host countries, particularly where their rights to work are circumscribed by their migration status (Borjas 2014; Bosh and Farré 2013; Triandafyllidou 2011; Pollock and Aung 2010; England and Henry 2013). Unfortunately, host countries and particularly developed host countries do not report consistent measurements of informal employment, nor are these measures broken down by sex and migration status. Moreover, the recent refinement of the measurement of the informal sector and informal employment by the ILO is largely only applied in developing countries (ILO 2012). The informal sector refers to the production and employment that takes place in unincorporated small or unregistered enterprises (1993 International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS)), informal employment refers to employment without legal and social protection – both inside and outside the informal sector (2003 ICLS) and the informal economy refers to all units, activities and workers so defined and the output from them.

Where the informal economy is estimated in developed economies, it is often done so on the basis of tax evasion and considers the shadow economy, without an explicit focus on informal employment or employment without statutory labour market protections (Andres et al 2011). Informal employment estimates vary greatly in the OECD, and even those that try to consistently measure the number of jobs without contracts, pensions and to which statutory labour provisions don’t apply, appear to either under or over-estimate the extent of informal work depending on the survey instrument used (ibid.). Underscoring that informality has become coterminous with undocumented migration, some of the OECD countries report estimates of the informal workforce based on estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants, assuming that this would provide a lower bound on the estimate of informal employment.
Hazan (2011) is one of the few studies that explore informality and migration status in Europe. The author analyses the European Social Survey data to explore informal employment in the main job in 30 countries. Hazan (2011) finds that immigrants from non-European Union source countries are more likely to be working without a contract in Eastern, Southern and parts of Western Europe. Northern Europe (comprising Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and parts of Western Europe (Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland) were the only regions where immigrant status was not significantly associated with a greater likelihood of being in informal employment. Budlender (2014) is another exception, whose study examines one of the top twenty labour importing countries. The author reports that for South Africa, the percentage of foreign-born migrants working in the informal sector is almost twice as high as that of locally-born non-migrants, although she finds that there is no difference between locally-born non-migrants and locally-born second generation migrants in this respect. Foreign-born migrants are also much more frequently found in precarious employment than locally born non-migrants and locally-born second generation migrants. The disproportionate penalty incurred is therefore by the first generation migrants.

The interaction of sex and migration status conspires to leave many women exposed to harsher conditions of employment in host countries who, as a result of their migration status and gender are among “the most vulnerable and unprotected groups of workers” (Chant and Pedwell 2008).

Despite the paucity of rigorous data on gender, informality and migration, more data exist on the sectoral and occupational segmentation of migrants by sex. Immigrant women tend work in highly sex segregated employment both sectorally and occupationally (ILO 2015b). As del Rio and Alonso-Villar (2012) demonstrate for Spain using employment data from 2007, immigrant women often find themselves “doubly segregated” since not only do their activities tend to be more feminized, but they are also engaged in more segregated activities than immigrant men. Immigrant women workers are employed in fewer sectors and occupations, and ones that are more densely populated by migrant women, than are immigrant men. When these authors explore the top ten occupations in which immigrant women had the highest relative presence, which includes domestic employees, indoor cleaning staff, catering service workers and personnel service workers, they find that these occupations employed 77 per cent of immigrant women, 45 per cent of native women, 21 per cent of immigrant men and 11 per cent of native men. The range of occupations in which there were almost no immigrant women was far greater than for immigrant men and for native men and women workers. The authors conclude that: “Consequently, immigrant women were at least 26 per cent more occupationally segregated than immigrant men” (del Rio and Alson-Villar 2012:112). These authors also motivate the degree of sex-segregation in the labour market for immigrant women as a direct consequence of their concentration in reproductive activities that replace or outsource care work. As they underscore: “The incorporation of immigrant women into the Spanish labour market cannot be properly understood without paying attention to the relationships between the concentration of women in reproductive work, the increasing participation of women in the labour market, and the social conditions that halt their participation”. The “social conditions” referred to here, describe the
rigid gender roles that disproportionately confine women to caring responsibilities in combination with the roll-back of welfare policies aimed at balancing family and labour market work.

Spain has certainly seen an increase in the proportion of outsourced and commodified care work undertaken by immigrant women. León (2011) echoes this finding in her research on immigrant care workers in Spain that reports that while the number of Spanish domestic workers has remained unaltered since 1996 (at just over 200,000), the number of foreign domestic workers has risen from 15,500 in 1996 to 320,000 in 2009. León argues that much of this work is un- or under-regulated both in Spain and throughout Europe and that it is undertaken increasingly by migrant workers in highly informal conditions. Orozco (2016) shows the extent of such under-regulation in Spain examining the Régimen Especial de Empleados de Hogar (REEH), the Special Regime for Household Employees. She notes:

The REEH rendered domestic workers ineligible for contributing to any social security scheme if they worked less than 19 hours per week; it denied them access to unemployment benefits; it also did not allow them sick leave until the 29th day of their illness; it exempted employment to ensure that domestic workers had a safe work environment, and it did not recognize that domestic workers may face occupational hazards. Moreover, it permitted employers to fire workers at will and it set much lower wages and severance pay for domestic workers than other workers, even though they worked longer hours (Orozco 2016: 109).

This type of labour regime has contributed to the rising informality of paid domestic work in Spain and has left the disproportionately female and migrant workforce exposed to labour rights violations. León (2010:416) sees scope for improvement, however, through reforms to both labour market and social policy. Indeed, she asserts that “while it is undeniable that housework is low paid, at the bottom of occupational categories and markedly carried out by migrant women in particularly vulnerable situations, there certainly is capacity for improvement, via formalisation and regularisation of the household sector.”

Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck (2010) writing on care work in Europe advance similar findings for Germany. These authors argue that the failure to resolve care burdens and place immigration reform higher on the domestic policy agenda has led to widespread clandestine care work in a twilight zone of undeclared work which can be viewed as an “‘open secret’ as it is the topic of extensive discussions among the populace and in the media.” Consequently, these authors assert that undeclared care migration is an “integral part of German welfare state policies” which they characterize as both “as compliance and complicity” with the need to resolve care needs and meet care deficits.

The United States is illustrative of a very similar situation of rising sectoral and occupational segregation for migrant workers. This segregation occurs in a context where the failure to achieve consensus on immigration reform has led to a continual rise in the numbers of
undocumented workers in less visible occupations in agriculture and in domestic and home help (Passel and Cohn 2015). An estimated 11 to 12 million undocumented individuals live in the United States (Hoeffer, Rytina, and Baker 2012). Although the numbers of undocumented immigrants working in a given occupational category are difficult to determine, Martin et al. (2009) estimate that within the U.S. direct care workforce, which includes home health care, approximately one in five immigrants (21 percent) are undocumented. As the Institute for Women’s Policy Research point out, there is a very real and pressing need to ensure that these workers can gain legal status in the United States.

This lack of legal status puts undocumented immigrants working in the care industry at risk for maltreatment by abusive or unscrupulous employers. In addition, the care industry itself—currently facing a growing labour shortage—is rendered unable to fully benefit from the work of immigrant workers who may want to provide in-home care, but are unable to find a legal path to enter the country or obtain employment once in the United States (Hess and Henrici 2013: i).

A recent report by DRUM (2012) an NGO that organizes undocumented workers from South Asia in New York City confirms that routes to formality are few and that immigrants face an increasingly hostile employment and social context:

“Immigrants are growing targets of punitive federal, state and local policies. While anti-immigrant policies affect many communities, South Asian low-wage workers, most of whom are or are perceived to be Muslim in New York City, have been particularly targeted and profiled since September 11, 2001. As a result, these workers live in constant fear of targeting and deportation and are forced to remain in exploitative jobs with little opportunity for advancement.” (DRUM 2012: II)

It is not surprising that under these conditions, that immigrant workers are not likely to press for employment that meets the statutory minimum standards set by the State of New York. From their survey of 180 workers, seven focus groups and ten in depth interviews with South Asian workers, DRUM researchers found that more than half of their sample earned less than the minimum wage. Two thirds were not allowed to take breaks during the day and that 95% did not have health insurance. Many of these exploitative jobs documented by DRUM are in care work and in the service sector in restaurants and food preparation, sectors and occupations that replace or outsource caring roles and tasks traditionally filled by native-born workers and primarily by women.

The situation of migrant health-care workers in the United States reveals that even in higher skilled job categories, the foreign born and those who are undocumented experience penalties. The United States is a country that imported over 2 million foreign temporary workers and trainees in 2014\textsuperscript{xii}, health care occupations are projected to account for about one in every six newly created jobs in the United States between 2010 and 2020. The Migration Policy Institute\textsuperscript{xii} reports that in 2010, 16 per cent of all U.S. health care workers were foreign born. Moreover, the foreign born accounted for more than one in four U.S. doctors (physicians and surgeons) in 2010.
By 2015, this figure had risen to nearly one in three. In 2010, women accounted for three of every four foreign-born health care workers. Nearly one-third of foreign-born women employed in health care occupations in 2010 worked as in health care support jobs as nursing, psychiatric, or home health aides. Interestingly, foreign-born health care workers were more likely to have a college education than their native-born counterparts in 2010 and the majority of immigrants employed in health care occupations in 2010 had naturalized as U.S. citizens. But, despite demonstrating high levels of attachment to the United States, in 2010, almost one-quarter of foreign-born workers employed in health care support jobs as nursing, psychiatric, or home health aides lacked health insurance themselves (MPI 2007).

The penalty for the undocumented and for those in more invisible spheres of work is even higher. Zahra Meghani (2016) explores the particular circumstances of undocumented home health workers in the United States, the majority of whom appear to be foreign born. As Meghani notes (2016:54) “The duties of home health workers include clinical and personal care for their adult clients, but the profession is often mistakenly equated with domestic work that is relegated to wives or the care work performed by mothers for their young.” Moreover, as Meghani points out, these workers are not covered by employment laws under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) that protects the right of employees as individuals to organize with other workers and engage in collective action because they are seen as domestic workers. Similarly, until very recently domestic workers were also not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) which aims to ensure a minimum living standard for all workers by establishing a minimum wage, overtime pay and other protections on working hours and remuneration. In 2013, the FSLA was finally extended to include direct care workers, including home health workers. Yet for many undocumented workers, the complex interplay of migration and labour regulations leaves them without labour protections occupying jobs that can be considered to be informal.

Segregated labour markets underpin wage gaps between the segregated groups (Blau and Kahn 2007). Where migrants are concentrated in a smaller number of occupations and sectors, they also face greater wage inequality when compared with native-born workers. The recent ILO Global Wage Report 2014-15 on wages and income inequality critically examines the source of migrant wage inequality and finds that persistent wage inequality in most labour importing countries cannot be fully explained by differences in age and education. This would imply that discrimination against non-native-born workers and their concentration in lower-wage employment leads to pervasive wage gaps. This is supported by an analysis by Gammage and Schmitt (2004) of migrants to the United States from Mexico, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic using United States Census data from 1990 and 2000. These authors undertake a decomposition of immigrant wage gaps by sex and occupation and find that in the case of women immigrants, gender wage gaps were not explained fully by educational differences, suggesting that the processes of discrimination influence both the sector of employment and levels of remuneration. Women immigrants are doubly discriminated against both for being women in feminized sectors and for being immigrants (Gammage and Schmitt 2004).
Segregated labour markets also contribute to other expressions of differential terms and conditions of employment, this holds for whatever characteristic is being considered the source of segregation, including sex, race, ethnicity, age (Borjas, 2015). This is particularly true of migrants imported to care. When it comes to care workers’ migration, the working conditions are notoriously difficult; the work involves isolation in private households, low wages and low status. Moreover, because the jobs are “informal,” as Michel (2011) notes, “they generally lack protection under conventional labor laws. For migrant caregivers, there are added problems: the sense of dislocation endemic to working abroad and often the danger of having entered a country illegally.” The problem is that in many developed nations, including the U.S. immigration to take up work on skilled or professional occupations excludes potential caregivers, who are categorized as “unskilled.” In higher income developing countries there are similar problems, and in contexts where care workers are imported for specific jobs and as temporary workers there may be even greater challenges to protecting the terms and conditions of employment (Varia 2006, 2014).

An additional challenge that many migrants face in the labour market, which contributes to their concentration in a narrower numbers of sectors and occupations, is the failure to recognize their skills in host countries. Many migrants experience deskilling and downgrading of their skills. This can be particularly acute in settings where migrant workers enter jobs that are considered to be unskilled such as care work. McGregor (2007) explore the multiple challenges faced by Zimbabwean care workers in the United Kingdom. Asking why social care has become an important sector of employment for this group of migrants, she examines the means by which migrants with different legal statuses have negotiated work in this sector. The article analyses the experiences of a highly educated, middle-class cohort, who left their country during the years of economic and political crisis following independence. Although some of the Zimbabweans McGregor interviews have been able to use transnational networks to find employment opportunities commensurate with their skills, others have ended up as paid care-givers, experiencing tremendous deskilling and a pervasive devaluation of their work. McGregor meticulously documents how excessive hours in low-status and often poorly paid jobs, the strain of working in highly feminised and racialized workplaces, and the insecurities and abuse produced by informality and clandestine employment have undermined the welfare and wellbeing of these migrants.

Finally, among the many concerns about the terms and conditions of employment for informal migrant workers is the lack of transnational social security systems. Van Walsum (2016) explores the case of migrant domestic and care workers observing that migrants are compelled to develop cross-border social security arrangements for their own benefit and that of their kin. She astutely observes that: “Moreover, as domestic workers and providers of home-based care, they are becoming integral to the social security systems of their country of employment and those systems, as a result of the presence of these workers, are becoming transnational in character” (van Walsum 2016:131). Van Walsum draws on her work with Ghanaian and Filipina domestic workers in Holland arguing that by excluding foreign migrants from their national social
insurance systems and services host countries deny migrants access to social safety nets and entitlements that render them more dependent on employers “increasing the possibility and scope of their exploitation” (van Walsum 2016:132). Moving towards portable pensions systems and universal access to social protection regardless of national origin would be one step to resolving this challenge. Worldwide there are examples of pensions portability and compatibility that allow workers to accrue pensions in one country and cash them out in situ or in other countries. Since care workers have been imported largely to resolve care deficits which are a feature of rising economic and demographic dependency rates, and their labour contributes to lowering these dependency ratios, it would seem only just to ensure their right to pensions and social security through their labour attachment.

**Global Care Chains and Transnational Parenting**

In this section we consider those “left behind” and the challenges of transnational parenting and motherhood. Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997) coined the concept of transnational motherhood in their seminal article “I’m here, but I’m there” to describe the struggle of women migrants, many of them mothers, who have sought work overseas to provide remittances and economic support to their families in home countries and whose parenting has become transnational as a result (Samman et al 2016; Parrenas 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997). This process creates situations in which the meanings of parenting and motherhood are rearranged to accommodate geographical separation over an extended period of time (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1997: 256).

In a world where women assume the majority of caring work, these patterns of transnational motherhood have led to another division of labour, involving mostly women, and resulting in an observable “care drain” and care substitution in the sending countries (Hochschild 2003 186: 7). This division of labour is one of many features of globalization that Hochschild has called the “care chain”, also referred to as the “global care chain,” which captures the distribution of care work and the corresponding patterns of gender, class and racial inequality in a global economy (Robinson 2006; Yeates 2011,2012). As the literature widely demonstrates, the care responsibilities of the migrant mother are, frequently, reassigned to another member of the household, usually a woman, who now has to shoulder the extra care duties in the mother’s absence (Parrenas 2005; Hugo 2002; Gamburd 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Yeates 2011, 2009). As Orozco (2016) poignantly notes:

“[T]he responsibility is transferred to women who have finished their reproductive cycle (i.e., elderly women who worked as caregivers for a long time and who should now be cared for themselves) or persons who are not yet ready to perform caregiving work (usually young girls and occasionally young boys) this process” (Orozco 2016: 117).

Without a doubt, informal childcare arrangements in the home country help many migrant women participate in the global labour force so that they can assume the role of transnational providers. These home country care arrangements also implicitly subsidize the global care chain.
The irony is that in the global care chain, migrants are exported to care for the children of others while their own children must in turn be cared for by others in the home country. The failure to recognize, reduce and redistribute care work in the home country contributes to the global displacement and unequal concentration of care burdens among the families with migrants abroad. The failure to recognize and properly value the role of migrant care work in host country care arrangements and social protection systems compounds the appropriation of care and surplus labour.

This, of course, works well for receiving countries whose own challenges of recognizing and redistributing care work have led to migrant women being imported to care and fostered their disproportionate concentration in informal employment in the care sector. The high and rising demand for care workers has produced a growing number of undocumented workers which has led a number of states to consider amnesty and regularization programs or explicitly develop temporary migration policies for care work. Drawing on the work of Monica Boyd (2011) and Helma Lutz (2010), Michel (2011) reports that:

Spain, for example, has intermittently opened its gates to low-skilled workers (Associated Press 2008), while Italy recently offered amnesty to all undocumented migrant care workers present in the country (ABS-CBN News 2009). Canada and Austria have taken a more measured approach, setting up temporary care work and circular migration programs respectively, while Germany has an unofficial policy of “state compliance and complicity” that allows “irregular” migrant caregivers to work more or less without interference (Michel 2011: 3).

While this appears to be part of a nascent push to recognize, reduce and redistribute care deficits in host countries, much remains to be done to formalize care work in host countries as well as to bear the collective responsibility for addressing rising care deficits in the home country (Badasu and Michel 2016; Lutz 2012; Parrenas 2005; Gamburd 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997). Care deficits in migrant sending home countries mean that several million children are currently growing up in the absence of their mother or father, or both, leaving poor countries to face a hidden crisis of children left alone, and with the poorest children at the highest risk (Samman et al 2016). Some of the figures are staggering. For example, Yanovich (2015) estimates that 100,000 children in Moldova and 200,000 in Ukraine have been left behind while an estimated 9 million of the total youth are left behind in the Philippines. Despite migrant mothers’ best effort to provide economic support through remittances and emotional support via skype and phone, family reunification remains a challenge, shifting care burdens in ways that tend to jeopardize the well-being and developmental outcomes of those left-behind (Parrenas 2005; Gamburd 2000).

5 The author of the UNICEF report, Melanie Reyes notes that there are no systematic data on children left-behind. These data are based on the compilation and study of the coalition of NGOs and advocacy groups in the Philippines.
Although elder women often accommodate child care in the mother’s absence, children, particularly girls are also an important source of childcare for their siblings and other relatives. As Parrenas (2005) and Gamburd (2000) showed in their study on transnational motherhood, daughters in the families left-behind are often the surrogate carers because entrenched social norms and gender stereotypes tend to hinder men’s involvement in care duties, and their assuming greater caring roles can be seen as a threat to definitions of masculinity. In a recent report on the global care crisis, Samman et al (2016) estimate that worldwide, about two-thirds (65%) of rural girls between the ages of 13 and 17 are involved in nonpaid care work, compared to 55% of urban girls in this age group and 37% of rural boys (Samman et al 2016: 40). The report further observes that adolescent girls, particularly those from the largest and poorest families, are often drafted into care work and are more likely to miss or drop out of school. For example, in Ethiopia, girls without siblings missed ten days of school compared to 21 days for those with five younger siblings, and 49 days for those with seven younger siblings (Frost and Rolleston 2013, cited in Samman et al 2016). Mapp (2010) reports similar findings in her research in which girls are kept at home to care for their younger siblings, taking away time they could spend doing homework (also cited in Badasu and Michel 2016).

The effects of care deficits in home countries are not limited to those left-behind but are also felt by the transnational parents in host countries. Many migrant mothers who have to endure separation from their own children, struggle to engage in transnational parenting. Ironically, the public arena and the media have accused these mothers of abdicating their caregiving roles (Hoang et al. 2015)—an accusation strongly grounded in social norms and gender stereotypes that reinforce the notion that children should be cared for by mothers (for details, see Finlay and Mancini’s study of care workers in Ireland in Meghani 2016: 23-52). But the real failure should be attributed to governments that do not recognize care as work, manifest in the absence of care regimes and inadequate policies to protect and support migrant women and their families in both the sending and receiving countries (Samman et al 2016: 44). The failure of States to socialize care is particularly derelict in the case of governments that actively export women to care abroad and facilitate migration for domestic work and health care.

To alleviate the care crisis in home and host countries, social protection policies need to be revisited to mitigate the negative effects of migrant care work on those left-behind, including children, “other-mothers” and the care workers themselves. These systems need to be made transnational in character by explicitly recognizing the transnational nature of the global labour markets that sustain them. To better guarantee rights to social protection and decent work, home and host countries need to pursue social protection systems with genuine universal application (Finlay and Mancini 2016: 32) that are transformative and have the potential to re-balance power relations and recognize the gendered nature of care work and the related time constraints (Samman et al 2016: 53). This will also require a redefinition of migration and social protection policies in both home and host countries, as well as allowing migrant care workers the possibility of family reunification.
The Role of the SDGs in Addressing the Gender, Migration and Work Nexus

Clearly, efforts to value care more highly and to recognize and professionalize care work have the potential to improve the terms and conditions of employment for those who provide care and work as care givers. Care subsidies and tax credits can enable households to afford care (Blau and Hagy 1998: Waldfogel 2001) and have the potential to “revalue” and increase the wages paid to care workers (England, Budig, and Folbre 2002). These subsidies need to be sufficient to ensure living wages and employment that is consistent with Decent Work. A host of other labour-market protections, including minimum wages and the right to collective bargaining would also be likely to produce better outcomes for workers in these occupations (Berg 2015; Kuptsch 2015). Ensuring that care workers also have social protection and access to pensions will also be critical in improving the terms and conditions of their employment. These types of labour market and social protection policies will also be more likely to guarantee the quality of care and make care work more transparent and improve accountability for both the carers and cared-for. They will also be consonant with achieving the targets laid out under goal 5.4. The explicit linking of these targets in SDG 5.4 to some of the key labour rights and conventions that address care work and care needs such as those ILO Conventions on maternity protection (C3, C103, C183) and on workers with family responsibilities (C156) as well as the UN’s CEDAW will also contribute to recognizing and valuing unpaid care and domestic work and promoting shared responsibility within the household and the family. These conventions and standards also provide a framework for implementing a series of labour market and social protection policies that recognize the importance and value of care work and enable workers to resolve care deficits and mediate their paid work and caring more effectively.

These same commitments in home countries will also serve to ameliorate the costs of separation for families where carers have left to work abroad. Commitments to social protection systems that are universal and transnational in character will be essential. Extending SDG Targets 1.1, 5.4 and 10.4 to implement transnational social security systems and floors will be particularly important for migrant workers.

Coordination and Policy to Improve the Terms and Conditions of Employment for Female Migrants in Host Countries

Some prominent initiatives attempt to address the collapse of entitlement to labour rights in labour importing countries and reduce the vulnerabilities of migrant workers. Among these is the ILO Fair Recruitment initiative. This initiative responds to the report by the Director General of the ILO to the 2014 International Labour Conference, which called for an agenda for fair migration and emphasized the “growing concern about abusive and fraudulent recruitment practices affecting migrant workers” (ILO 2016b). The “Fair Recruitment Initiative” aims to “prevent human trafficking and forced labour, protect the rights of workers, including migrant workers, from abusive and fraudulent practices during the recruitment process (including pre-selection, selection, transportation, placement and possibility to return) and reduce the cost of labour migration and enhance development outcomes for migrant workers and their families, as
well as for countries of origin and destination” (ibid). The ILO uses its tripartite platform and legitimacy to secure commitments from government, unions and the private sector in support of this agenda and is working actively with the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) and affiliates, in particular the International Confederation of Private Employment Services (CIETT).

One of the aims of the Fair Recruitment Initiative is to “advance and share knowledge on policies, laws, emerging practices and challenges related to the recruitment of workers within and across countries” (Jones 2015:3). The initiative has amassed a series of documents and analyses of global recruitment networks, migration in key global value chains, the recruitment of specific types of workers (domestic servants, cooks, gardeners and construction workers) particularly in the Gulf States, case studies of promising recruitment practices, and the laws governing private intermediaries recruiting international workers. It is an important repository of documents that attest to the evolving and burgeoning lattice of regulations that cover recruitment and placement of foreign workers and govern their access to work and the entitlements that they receive through their employment. Because of the growing flows of migrant domestic workers, many of these documents pertain to the laws, regulations and policies governing international recruitment of domestic workers.

Among this series of reports, Katherine Jones’ (2015) document highlights the complexity of laws and regulations that govern the recruitment of migrant domestic workers from Bangladesh in Jordan and Lebanon. She also draws attention to the increasing role of bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding in defining a set of labour protections and minimum standards that secures a continual flow of migrant workers from origin to host countries, particularly in Asia:

[… ] in 2012, the governments of Jordan and Bangladesh signed a Memorandum of Understanding (bilateral agreement), in effect opening up the latter as a country from which women aged between 25 and 46 could legally be recruited as domestic workers for households in the former. The governments agreed that the (Jordanian) employers should pay the full cost of recruiting Bangladeshi women, including visa fees and airfare; provide employees with private sleeping quarters and food; purchase a life insurance policy for their employee that covers the entire period of employment; and open a bank account in which her salary should be deposited each month (Jones 2015:14).

These bilateral agreements overlay existing labour and migration legislation and compensate for the fact that certain sectors, most notably domestic work, are frequently not covered by national labour law. They also provide a framework for redress, both by individual workers but also by states. Yet these agreements must be underpinned by consular resources and investment in outreach to foreign workers, along with effective monitoring and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Many of these bilateral agreements evolved in response to labour and human rights abuses perpetuated by recruitment agencies. Varia (2006) reported on the extensive use of usurious credit
and onerous repayment conditions that Indonesian domestic workers migrating to the Middle East experience when they take out loans from local moneylenders with interest rates as high as 100 percent to pay these fees. In Singapore and Hong Kong, Indonesian migrant domestic workers often spend up to ten months out of a two-year contract without a salary since they must turn over these wages to repay their recruitment fees (Varia 2014, 2006). In this context, domestic workers can find themselves in debt-bondage, leading to indentured servitude and penury, bound to employers and paying exorbitant fees to recruitment agencies, (Davidson 2013).

In an attempt to regulate recruitment agencies and reduce labour and human rights abuses, labour exporting countries have also engaged in the selective application of recruitment bans. In Lebanon and Jordan, Jones (2015:16) reports that the imposition of recruitment bans by many countries of origin has left recruiters with a “large shortfall in satisfying client demands for domestic workers.” Clearly, such bans do not stop recruitment from those countries entirely, but they have the potential to slow down flows of labour particularly where organizing recruitment becomes more onerous and difficult, or where fines and sanctions are imposed.

The evolution of greater regulation surrounding recruitment is in response to the negative and increasingly accessible reports of labour rights abuses but also reflects the growing interest on the part of higher income countries to recruit temporary migrant labour for specific occupations and job categories. In 2014, the ILO and the World Bank commissioned an assessment of the Memoranda of Understanding and bilateral agreements that had emerged as part of their ongoing cooperation through the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD). After reviewing a total of 65 agreements between states in the Asia-Pacific region and the Gulf the assessment benchmarked the agreements against 18 good practices. Among the good practices embedded in these MOUs and the framework that supported them, the following featured highly: provisions relating employment contracts to applicable labour laws, the establishment of implementation, monitoring and evaluation procedures, the definition of clear and reciprocal responsibilities between contracting parties, the development of mechanisms for complaints and dispute resolution procedures and the provision for free transfer of savings and remittances (ILO 2015).

In an ILO report, the author Wickramasekara (2014) identified a number of additional clauses and protections enshrined in MOUs that also had the potential to ensure greater attention to migrant labour rights. She found a number of agreements that are specific to domestic workers (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Malaysia) that recognize the particular vulnerabilities of work in the sector, and the disproportionate risk potentially born by women migrant workers. Wickramaekara also identified new migration laws and policies that have been enacted in host countries and that include explicit reference to and articles on the role of bilateral agreements in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Nepal. More importantly, there is evidence that the State is stepping into the recruitment space with the revival of government-to-government agreements and the use of public employment services. This is happening in the Republic of Korea, New Zealand,
Bangladesh and Malaysia. This affords more opportunities for regulated migration and for migrants to make claims on duty bearers and hold the state to account. What Wickramaekara also notes is that the increasing role of the State has led to dramatic reductions in migration costs. She highlights the case of the Republic of Korea’s Employment Permit System (EPS), through which the government-to-government agreements are accompanied by regular dialogue and investment channelled to support services by the Republic of Korea.

In general the bilateral agreements, when they are underpinned by good governance and monitored effectively appear to yield more benefits than the application and use of model contracts between an employer and a migrant worker— which appear to be less binding and enforceable. Absent meaningful protection under labour laws, employment contracts frequently present the only mechanism to describe and guarantee employers’ and workers’ rights and obligations. These contracts should, in theory, be enforceable in the courts. But when migrant workers are denied mobility, their passports and identity documents are withheld, and they lack access to and knowledge of how to reach and use justice mechanisms, these contracts can be a very weak labour rights tool (ITUC 2014). Indeed Jones (2015) observes in her article on international recruitment, that “Recruiters reported that employers do not tend to pay much attention to the standard employment contract they are required to co-sign with their domestic worker employee.” In her report for the ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative, a Jordanian interviewee explained: “only 40 per cent [of employers] read it. Those that don’t read it ask me questions about it. I don’t stress that they have to read it; sometimes I make a copy for them to take home. But not every employer takes a copy” (cited in Jones 2015:23).

The case of Kenya contrasts with that of Asia where the incremental growth of MOUs in Asia, between countries that have consular presence and an ability to respond to their foreign workers abroad, has provided more effective labour protections. A bilateral agreement was signed between Kenya and the United Arab Emirates in 2015 to recruit 100,000 Kenyans for jobs in specific sectors of the economy including construction and domestic work. As Malit and Al Youha (2016) observe: “Unlike many Asian labour-sending countries—India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, among them—Kenya has no formal institutions such as labour or welfare offices in the United Arab Emirates to protect its nationals from abuse and exploitation.” Consequently the Kenyan diplomatic missions lack grievance and dispute resolution programs, counselling mechanisms, post-arrival orientation programs, and means of verifying contracts and monitoring compliance. Although the Kenyan government did set up a hotline in the United Arab Emirates and undertake limited outreach to enable distressed workers to seek assistance, its diplomatic missions lack the financial resources and mechanisms to effectively address complaints.

Malit and Al Youha (2016) undertook a careful review of the labour rights violations reported by Kenyan workers including illegal and unethical recruitment practices, overcharging and charging migrants for visas, contract substitution, withholding pay and benefits, and in the case of domestic workers: “physical, financial, and in some cases sexual maltreatment by their employers.” Malit and Al Youha also report that domestic workers have expressed concern about
the “limited access to dispute resolution and mediation” as they are excluded from labour law in the host country.

It is not surprising then, that the International Trade Union Confederation continues to have significant concerns about the limits of bilateral agreements, particularly in the context of immigration to the Gulf States. Although the bilateral agreements provide some basis for Asia-Pacific governments to “press for better treatment of nationals working in the Gulf, these agreements do not appear to have materially improved the conditions for workers in practice anywhere in the region.” Where migrant domestic workers are excluded from labour laws and are subject to restrictive immigrations regimes in many of the Gulf countries dominated by the kafala sponsorship laws that grant employers “extraordinary control” over their employees, “no bilateral agreement will provide adequate protection against exploitation” (ITUC 2014). The ITUC calls for a fundamental overhaul of the region’s labour laws and the abolishment of the kafala system. The ITUC also underscores that where labour law is weak or absent, inspection mechanisms underfunded and under-resourced, fines and sanctions insufficient to dissuade abusive practices, that these bilateral agreements have little traction. The fact that few bilateral agreements make any reference to existing norms and standards and fundamental rights and freedoms at work, such as the right to organize and form a union or bargain collectively, means that workers cannot organize, articulate and defend their rights. In such a context rights are given but not easily claimed.

Conclusions and Recommendations
This section summarizes some of the key findings from this background paper and provides recommendations for how some of the SDG goals and targets can address migrant women worker’s rights and how these goals and targets can be linked to the existing labour and human rights architecture. This section will also consider other UN and bilateral initiatives that have the potential to address migrant workers’ rights and particularly women migrant workers’ rights including the ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative and bilateral agreements through MOUs to facilitate safe migration and protect migrant workers’ rights.

The overview of migration trends and labour market outcomes in home and host countries underscores that migrants and particularly women migrants appear to be flowing into countries where the labour force participation of women is rising in tandem with rising old age dependency ratios. This appears to indicate that the need for care and particularly elder care may also be growing in these host countries. Migrant women arriving in the top twenty labour importing countries are leaving home countries where decent work opportunities are relatively scarcer than in the corresponding host countries. Moreover, migrant women arriving in the top twenty labour importing countries are coming to and seeking work in contexts with more de jure and de facto labour rights.

This overview of the macro trends is complicated by the paucity of data, and in particular data on women migrants and their labour market insertion and the terms and conditions of their
employment in host countries. We complement the macro overview by looking at some key articles on labour market outcomes for migrant women in a number of host countries and find that the micro data and case studies support a more nuanced analysis. These studies support the view that highly sex segmented labour markets with migrant women concentrating in more feminized and racialized sectors lead to fewer labour market entitlements. Indeed, in many of these case studies the findings underscore that migrants are more likely to be in informal labour markets not covered by labour market regulations and without access to social protection. This is particularly galling in contexts where women migrants are selectively and proactively hired into social protection systems as comparatively cheaper labour to ensure their continued functioning in host countries.

The preceding discussion of labour rights highlights the need to link many of the goals and targets in the SDGs to existing norms and conventions. This explicit linking would have the potential to reinforce the importance of the conventions, ensure the preconditions to increase the number of signatories and provide a mechanism to hold duty-bearers to account. As the debates ensue about what indicators to monitor and how to ensure accountability, linking targets such as 8.8 to protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment, to fundamental rights and freedoms as embodied in core conventions on labour rights will be critical. Ensuring consistent reporting and naming and shaming of those State and private sector entities that violate these rights will be essential to create a system of accountability that makes the targets bind and provides a platform for civil society to make claims on duty bearers.

It is interesting to note that most of the targets in Goal 8 have already been explicitly linked to some of the core labour rights conventions, Treaty Bodies and Universal Periodic Reviews (See Annex 1, Table 2). This is true for three of the targets associated with 8.5 and 8.8. This is not the case for any of the targets included in Goal 5, although they could clearly be linked to some of the key conventions on maternity leave (C3, 103 and 183), those on workers with family responsibilities (C156) and non-discrimination and equal pay (C100 and 111).

The recent success of coalitions of unions, domestic workers and NGOs in securing the ILO Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic workers highlights the importance of coalition-building and advocacy to extend labour rights (Gammage and Hennebry 2016; Kabeer 2015; Boris and Fish 2014).

The use of CEDAW and other treaty bodies by civil society organisations is particularly interesting in claims-making. These organisations use the treaty bodies and submit shadow reports as part of a process that increases the knowledge base of the reviewers and appears to contribute substantially to the naming and shaming of countries and governments that are failing to uphold the conventions. The shadow reporting increases the information shared at the review and greatly contributes to oversight, informing recommendations and raising consciousness about key issues. Once recommendations have been emitted, they form the basis for further reporting and oversight by governments and civil society.
Envisioning similar types of oversight mechanisms and linking the SDG goals and targets to state commitments to uphold norms and conventions may also be effective for goal 5.4 to “recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate.” Linking these commitments to Conventions such as 156 on Workers with Family Responsibilities and to CEDAW and other of the maternity conventions could prove tremendously effective in providing mechanisms for recourse redress and civil society oversight.

Yet as Fiona Williams (2010:23) elegantly and eloquently reminds us, one of the most challenging aspirations that we face in the realm of care is to raise the political, economic and social value of care. “This will mean shifting the responsibility, power and control in four areas of redistribution of care from families to the state, from mothers to fathers, from care providers to those receiving care and support, and from richer to poorer nations” (Williams 2010:23). Combining discourses and strategies for the implementation of the SDGs, ensuring that feminisms and their expressions in developed and developing countries also embrace the terms and conditions of care and care work and provide platforms for both paid and unpaid carers to make claims on the state will be essential.

This paper demonstrates that global commitments to the SDGs have the potential to both resolve care deficits and protect migrant worker rights in labour importing countries. Yet these commitments are largely viewed as being relevant only for development and foreign AID commitments and funding and not for domestic policy in developed countries. Moreover in the SDG literature there has been very little analysis of how the SDGs are relevant to developed and higher income countries. There is significant potential to use the SDG framework to expand claims on duty bearers, including the State to simultaneously address care deficits and worker rights in labour importing countries. However these commitments are more likely to be upheld where the system of indicators monitoring their fulfilment includes explicit links to existing norms and conventions and treaty bodies with established mechanisms for civil society, union and private sector oversight and input. While Goal 8 has some explicit references to key conventions and norms, Goal 5 does not. The delinking of the SDGs from established conventions and treaty bodies may present a challenge for civil society oversight and ultimately for State accountability, particularly, but not exclusively as it relates to migration and care deficits.

Finally, national governments and their legislatures must also take on the responsibility of making the SDGs pervious to democratic processes and oversight. Non-state actors must also be brought into the accountability framework, a task that will be more challenging. As Bissio (2014) writes cogently: “Accountability is only meaningful if the powerful can be brought into account.” We must find binding ways to hold the powerful to account and this is likely to mean against their interests. This means third-party monitoring and evaluation which compels transparency of information and access to information and links violations to sanctions. Indeed,
as Bissio (2014) underscores in his presentation to the General Assembly on “Elements for a Monitoring and Accountability Framework for the Post-2015 Development Agenda”: “Without effective monitoring and accountability of the powerful there will be no development agenda and the multilateral system will lose its legitimacy.” We must strive to make this system work and make it work for everyone including migrants and transnationals, the stateless as well as citizens, lauding the universal nature of these commitments and their application.
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Annex

Figure 1. Percentage Change in the Labour Force Participation of Women and the Change in the Stock of Female Migrants in the Top Twenty Labour Importing Countries (2000-2014)

Source: UNDESA and World Development Indicators

Figure 2. Percentage Change in the Proportion of Female Migrants and the Old Age Dependency Ratio in 2015 in the Top Twenty Labour Importing Countries (2000-2014)

Source: UNDESA and World Development Indicators
Figure 3. GDP per Capita in Home and Host Countries circa 2015

Source: World Development Indicators

Figure 4. Poverty Rates at National Poverty Lines in Home and Host Countries (circa 2013)

Source: World Development Indicators
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Country</th>
<th>Home Country (primary sending country)</th>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Target</td>
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<td><strong>Target 5.4:</strong> Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies, and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate</td>
<td>4. Percentage of eligible population covered by national social protection programs</td>
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<td>42. Average number of hours spent on paid and unpaid work combined (total work burden), by sex</td>
<td>Convention 103: Maternity Protection(revised), 1952</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Convention 156: Workers with Family Responsibilities, 1981</td>
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<td>Convention 183: Maternity Protection, 2000</td>
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<td>CEDAW, 1979</td>
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<td>8.5 by 2030 achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value</td>
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<th>5.1. Gender gap in wages, by sector of economic activity</th>
<th>7. Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100)</th>
<th>Recommendation 204 transition from informal to formal work</th>
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<td>8. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)</td>
<td>8.5. Employment to population ratio (EPR) by gender and age group (15–64)</td>
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<td>57. Ratification and implementation of fundamental ILO labor standards and compliance in law and practice</td>
<td>1. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87)</td>
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<td>2. Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)</td>
<td>3. Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)</td>
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<td>4. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)</td>
<td>8.6. Share of informal employment in total employment</td>
<td>Recommendation 204 transition from informal to formal work</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.8 protect labor rights and promote safe and secure working environments of all workers, including migrant workers, particularly women migrants, and those in precarious employment</td>
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<td>5. Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)</td>
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<td>6. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)</td>
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<td>7. Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100)</td>
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<td>8. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)</td>
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| 8.3. [Indicator of decent work] – to be developed |
| 1. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) |
| 2. Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) |
| 3. Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) |
| 4. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) |
| 5. Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) |
| 6. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) |
| 7. Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) |
| 8. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention |

Note: Some of the indicators appear several times because they will be used to monitor other targets.

Source: Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the Sustainable Development Goals Launching a data revolution for the SDGs, Revised Working Draft 6, February 2015.
and source-specific coding rules; and the rules to convert the coded information into normalized indicators. The country profiles provide detailed and verifiable information over time that can be easily traced back to the original textual source.

It should be noted, however, that Turkey is currently host to almost two million Syrian refugees.

These are calculated using national poverty lines reported in the World Development Indicators.

In 2003, the International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) held in Geneva defined new concepts related to this topic. The main achievement was to develop guidelines for a new conceptual framework which distinguishes between informality from the perspective of production units as observation units on the one hand and that of jobs as observation units on the other.

This is applying the same definition to different labor force surveys.

The informal sector consists of economic units that are not registered or legally constituted.


Data on the numbers of migrant workers in home health care are inconsistent and sparse. Hess and Henrici (2013) in their analysis of home health care workers estimate that 74 percent of the population of home health workers in the US are foreign born.

Some of these examples are in Latin America between Argentina and Paraguay but also among the developed nations.