BUILDING A STRONGER EVIDENCE BASE: THE IMPACT OF GENDER IDENTITIES, NORMS AND RELATIONS ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A case study of Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines
At Monash University, the research team was led by Professor Jacqui True and consisted of Dr. Melissa Johnson, Dr. Eleanor Gordon, Ms. Yasmin Chilmeran and Ms. Yolanda Riveros-Morales at the Centre for Gender, Peace and Security (Monash GPS) who each have expertise in gender, peace, conflict and qualitative and quantitative community-based research methods. In Bangladesh, the research team from Bangladesh was led by Ms. Nazmun Nahar (country team leader); in Indonesia, the research team was led by Dr. Sri Eddyono (country team leader) and Devita Putri, Rizky Septiana Widyaningtyas from Gadjah Mada University (GMU); and in the Philippines, the research team was led by Josephine Perez (country team leader), and Beverly Orozco (Ateneo de Manila University). Copy-editing was provided by Sara Phillips. This project has ethics approval through the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (Monash University Human Ethics Research Approval 2017-7344-14240) and followed the guidelines and protocols set out by this Committee. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of UN Women, the United Nations or any of its affiliated organizations.

Produced by UN Women Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific.

Authors: Dr. Melissa Johnston, Professor Jacqui True (Primary Investigator), Dr. Eleanor Gordon, Yasmin Chilmeran, and Yolanda Riveros-Morales (Monash GPS)

Researchers: Dr. Sri Eddyono, Devita Putri, Rizky Septiana Widyaningtyas, and Dr. Arvie Johan (Gadjah Mada University); Josephine Perez and Beverly Orozco (Ateneo de Manila University); Nazmun Nahar (Oxfam Bangladesh)

Text: Melissa Johnston, Jacqui True, Eleanor Gordon, Yasmin Chilmeran and Roshni Menon

Editor: Roshni Menon

Production Coordination: Lesli Davis

Design: Blossoming.it
BUILDING A STRONGER EVIDENCE BASE: THE IMPACT OF GENDER IDENTITIES, NORMS AND RELATIONS ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A case study of Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines

April 2020
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of boxes, figures and tables 6  
Acronyms and abbreviations 7  
Glossary 8  
Executive summary 9

1. INTRODUCTION: CONNECTING THE DOTS BETWEEN VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, GENDER INEQUALITY AND EXTREMIST VIOLENCE 16

2. FRAMING THE RESEARCH: QUESTIONS, METHODS AND PARTICIPANTS 19  
   2.1. Research sites 20  
   2.2. Research design and analysis 21  
   2.3. Field research participants 22  
   2.4. Key findings and outline 23

3. GENDER IDENTITIES AND RELATIONS AS DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: RESEARCH FINDINGS IN BANGLADESH, INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES 24  
   3.1. Male leadership, gender stereotypes and gender relations 25  
      3.1.1. Pressure on men to provide for families can push them into extremist activity 26  
      3.1.2. There is some support for women’s leadership in the Philippines and Indonesia 27  
   3.2. Women’s violent extremist participation 29  
      3.2.1. Marriage, wifely obedience and male authority 30  
      3.2.2. Pursuit of freedom and adventure 31  
      3.2.3. Poverty is an important driver for engagement with violent extremist groups 32  
      3.2.4. Status and initial freedom within organizations 32  
   3.3. Education as a site where gender norms are politicized 32  
      3.3.1. Education has little effect on the gender division of labour 33  
      3.3.2. Education institutions are sites where extremist recruitment can occur 33  
      3.3.3. Campus based extremist groups target women students and redeploy the language of feminist struggle 34  
      3.3.4. ‘Gender rules’ become stricter the longer a woman is a member of a campus group 34  
   3.4. The role of parents 35

4. GENDERED RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES AND ACTIVITY IN BANGLADESH, INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES 37  
   4.1. Gender regressive attitudes permeate recruitment strategies 38  
      4.1.1. Violent extremist groups promote practices that harm women and girls online and offline 38
4.1.2. Women’s use of the phone and internet are policed 39
4.1.3. Demands for gender equality are sometimes equated with extremism 39

4.2. Notions of masculinity and femininity are exploited by violent extremists 40
4.2.1. Feminism is portrayed on extremist websites as rooted in capitalism and cause of moral decay 41
4.2.2. In place of feminism, extremist groups promote ‘gender complementarity’ 41

4.3. Women who seek male protection from conflict can be recruited 42

4.4. Corruption, unemployment and a sense of unmet (economic) demands fuel resentment and incentivise extremist participation 43

4.5. Recruiters exploit partial knowledge of religious teachings 44

4.6. The use of violent messaging to increase support for violent extremism is common 44

5. KEY RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 46
5.1. Support for violence against women increases the likelihood of support for violent extremism 49
5.2. Violence against women likely plays a key role in violent extremist movements 54
5.3. Misogynistic attitudes among women are strongly correlated with support for violent extremism 54
5.4. Increased or decreased levels of education do not affect a person’s support for violent extremism or for violence against women 56
5.5. There was no consistent link between levels of religiosity and support for violent extremism 57
5.6. Mothers have a critical role in effective prevention of violent extremism, though fathers also play a vital, though sometimes overlooked, role 57

6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 58

Works cited 61
Academic literature 61
Reports 63
New reports and websites 65

Appendix A: Survey questions 68
Appendix B: Survey scales 71
Endnotes 72
LIST OF BOXES,
FIGURES AND TABLES

BOXES
Box 1: Background to UN Women – Monash GPS research project
Box 2: Definitions: Gender regressive, benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, gender complementarity
Box 3: Areas of future research

FIGURES
Figure 1: Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives [Q37]
Figure 2: The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men [Q35]
Figure 3: The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men [Q34]
Figure 4: When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced to or pressured by male family members [q48]
Figure 5: I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights [Q54]
Figure 6: If groups are fighting for their religious ideals and way of life, they are justified in using violence, even if it breaks the law and injures civilians [Q46]
Figure 7: Violence against women, hostile misogyny and benevolent sexism are better indicators of violent extremism than other variables
Figure 8: Hostile sexist attitudes according to category, gender disaggregated

TABLES
Table 1: Research sites in three countries
Table 2: List of online sources
Table 3: Generalized ordered logit model regression of relationship of strong support for violent extremism with ten independent variables
# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus group discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female genital mutilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTI</td>
<td><em>Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key informant interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTQI</td>
<td>Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer Intersex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUHREC</td>
<td>Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td><em>Nahdlatul Ulama</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/CVE</td>
<td>Preventing/countering violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td><em>Partai Kommunis Indonesia</em> (Indonesian Communist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td><em>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</em> (Prosperous Justice Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>US Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAW</td>
<td>Violence against women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Allahu akbar</em></td>
<td>“Allah is the greatest” – a common Islamic Arabic expression, used by Muslims in various contexts, including prayer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Aurat</em></td>
<td>Naked / genitalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dakwah</em></td>
<td>Proselytization or missionary work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Fitnah</em></td>
<td>Slander / sedition / seduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hadith</em></td>
<td>Traditions or sayings of Prophet Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Haram</em></td>
<td>Profane/proscribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hijab</em></td>
<td>Veil / head covering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Imam</em></td>
<td>Islamic term for religious leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jemaah islamiyah</em></td>
<td>An Indonesian violent extremist group with links to al-Qaeda, responsible for a series of attacks, including the Bali bombings of 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jihad</em></td>
<td>Striving or struggling in Arabic. Often a struggle or fights against the enemies of Islam or alternatively, an internal struggle against sin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Khosidah</em></td>
<td>Poetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Liqa</em></td>
<td>Recitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Madrassa</em></td>
<td>Religious school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Majelis taklim</em></td>
<td>Religious discussion group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mujahid</em></td>
<td>Martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mudjahida</em></td>
<td>A term for a female active in Jihad (in the Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Muslimah</em></td>
<td>A Muslim woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Nikah muda</em></td>
<td>Early marriage (child marriage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Niqab</em></td>
<td>Veil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Purdah</em></td>
<td>Veil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ridho/ridha</em></td>
<td>Pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sunnah</em></td>
<td>Deeds of the Prophet Mohammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Syahid</em></td>
<td>Martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Taaruf</em></td>
<td>Arranged marriage between families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Toril</em></td>
<td>Religious boarding schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ushra</em></td>
<td>A study circle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents novel research findings – possibly the first such robust findings to date – on the relationship between support for misogyny, violence against women, and extremist violence in Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines. In partnership with un Women Asia Pacific, The Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre sought to address the lack of empirical gender analysis of violent extremism, by examining why and how radicalisation to violence occurs from a gender perspective.

What was studied and why

The study specifically explores the relationship between misogyny (or hostile sexism) and violent extremism. To this end, key questions for study included:

1. How and why are societal gender identities and relations drivers of violent extremism, both enabling and countering ideological fundamentalism and political violence?

2. How are constructions of masculinity and femininity used by violent extremist groups to radicalise and recruit men and women, particularly in the Asia and Pacific region?

Through better understanding the gendered drivers of violence, it may be possible to isolate potential perpetrators of violent extremism and to focus programming on effective methods to prevent radicalization amongst men and women.

Research methods and data analysis

In each country, the research utilized a mixed-method approach, comprising qualitative research (focus group discussions [FGDs], key informant interviews [KIIs] and observations), a quantitative (survey analysis) study and online content analysis in Indonesia. Qualitative field research across four sites in each of the three countries comprised 94 FGDs, 32 KIIs and 22 community observations. In addition, a survey of 3,052 people (1,479 women and 1,573 men) was undertaken in vulnerable areas known to be at risk of violent extremism in Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines between October and December 2019. The questions and discussion centered on people’s social media use, religiosity, masculinity, sexism, and attitudes and behaviors regarding violence against women. Responses were on a five-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The analysis of the data involved conducting bivariate regressions using the pearson correlation coefficient (‘r’) to examine the strength and direction of the relationship between support for violent extremism and key variables thought to be of causal relevance, ranging from hostile and paternalist sexism to education, religiosity and support for violence against women, amongst others. Ordered logit regression modelling of all variables enabled the researchers to further explore the significance of the bivariate analysis. The qualitative research, meanwhile, helped to shed light and interpret the survey results and to corroborate them across different contexts contextually.
Key research findings

Three key findings undergird the richness of information that was garnered through focus group discussions, interviews and survey results during fieldwork:

1. Hostile sexism and support for violence against women are strongly associated with support for violent extremism. There is a positive and significant correlation in survey responses in all three countries and for both genders between support for violent extremism and their support for violence against women. In fact, ordered logit regression modeling of survey results found that in all three countries, people who support violence against women (that is, those who claimed that men are justified in using violence against women) are three times more likely to support violent extremism.

2. No significant relationship was found between religiosity, age, gender and level of education achieved and support for violent extremism. Attitudes about violence against women explain more of the variation in support for violent extremism than other factors (such as age or education level) commonly theorised to explain individual support of violent extremism. Moreover, support for violence against women and the prevalence of hostile sexist attitudes are both better predictors of support for violent extremism than religiosity.

3. Misogyny and support for violence against women are important and overlooked factors in compelling some people, including women, to support violent extremism. In fact, misogyny (or hostile sexism) is correlated strongly with violence against women. And in turn, there is a significant, positive and moderate correlation between misogyny and support for violent extremism, as well as a significant, though weaker relationship between benevolent sexism (that is, adherence to traditional gender norms or values) and violent extremism. Misogynistic attitudes among women are also strongly correlated with support for violent extremism. For example, in Bangladesh and Indonesia, the strength of this association is stronger and higher for women than for men.

Figure 1.

Violence against women, hostile misogyny and benevolent sexism are better indicators of violent extremism than variables such as age and religiosity
In addition to these headline findings, researchers also gleaned more granular information on the gendered drivers of violent extremism:

- Masculinity in all three countries is defined by male leadership and earning power, as well as violence and male protection of women and the family more broadly.

- Most survey respondents and qualitative research participants in all three countries reported having come across online media supporting violent extremism or ‘jihad.’
Baseline attitudes can be sexist, especially among men. Therefore, any efforts to assert women’s rights can be politicised and made contentious by extremist groups on platforms aimed specifically at men and women.

Where a male relative—a partner, son or brother—supports or is a member of a violent extremist group, women are more likely to support violent extremism. This is due to gender norms that emphasize obedience in wives, daughters and female relatives in general.

However, women themselves may support violence perpetrated against themselves or other women, including for their own protection. For example, in Bangladesh and Indonesia, this strength of association between support for violent extremism and support for violence against women is stronger and higher for women than for men.

Some women also engage with violent extremist groups due to a desire for adventure, belonging and freedom. Sometimes this is seen as a way to escape controlling parents at home.

Economic drivers of violent extremism—i.e. poverty—were present across all the cases.

Shifting labor patterns—namely the entry of more women into the workforce—have threatened male hegemony, to varying degrees, in Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Mothers’ perceived roles in supporting violence prevention or preventing violent extremism often relies on idealised notions of women and femininity as inherently peaceful.

“Caring fathers” are often overlooked as actors in preventing violent extremism.

The research also found that violent extremist groups are especially adept at playing on people’s weaknesses and insecurities in order to recruit new members. Research has shown that violent extremists exploit notions of masculinity and femininity to radicalize and recruit men and women. Specific recruitment strategies involve several related elements, which include:

a. **Promoting gender regressive attitudes**: this includes practices that harm women and girls (such as polygamy and female genital mutilation), limiting women’s use of social media and the telephone and equating demands for gender equality with extremism.

b. **Exploiting notions of masculinity and femininity**: violent extremist recruitment strategies have centred on ideas of male protection, as well as breadwinner and soldiering masculinities, which emphasize a model of masculinity based on being the primary income earner and ‘fighter’ for the family and for traditional values. On the flip side, the also portray feminism as rooted in capitalism and the cause of moral decay in society. Consequently, the notion of ‘gender complementarity’ is promoted, that is the idea that men and women have complementary, fixed roles in society with men typically being the head of the family or household and income earner and women being nurturers who take care of the household.

c. **Exposing men and women to a myriad of uncertainties, including trauma, violence and conflict dynamics**: violent extremists can exploit and recruit women who seek male protection from conflict. This is because women and men sometimes join extremist groups for a sense of protection or security, particularly in times of conflict when insecurity and poverty levels are high.
This perceived need for protection can be manipulated through the messaging of violent extremist groups, particularly if women are alone or their husbands have joined violent extremist groups.

d. **Cultivating a sense of resentment due to corruption, unemployment and unmet economic demands:** while vulnerability to recruitment messaging may not always be a socio-economic issue, there is nevertheless an element of frustration with rising corruption, lack of access to jobs and unmet economic demands, which have in turn inspired both grievances against governments and political organization to voice these grievances. In some cases, this results in young people being vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists.

e. **Exploiting partial knowledge of religious teachings:** participants mentioned ideology and false beliefs as being part of a repertoire for recruitment, with some people falling victim to misinterpretations, fanaticism and/or violent interpretations of religion.

f. **Using violent messaging to increase support for violent extremism:** the digital space is being used to spread political messaging, ideas of religious intolerance, and violent and extremist images and videos. Much of this social media content is used to incite mass anger or a sense of resentment for wrongs committed against a community. This type of reporting—say, on the suffering of Muslim refugees or war victims—is used to increase support for violent extremist groups in some regions.

Finally, some findings were especially strong in individual countries, reflecting slightly differing beliefs about the roles of men and women in society, as well as the causes of violent extremism. Some of the background rationale, causes and responses to involvement in violent extremist groups, as reported by research participants in individual countries, are listed below.

**In Bangladesh:**

- Gender norms of the male breadwinner and female homemaker are more rigidly enforced in Bangladesh than in Indonesia or in the Philippines.

- The use of violence to force women out of the public sphere is a significant part of the way women’s behaviour and mobility have been controlled, effectively precluding most from taking leadership or other public roles.

- Corruption and unemployment are particularly strong factors that continue to fuel resentment.

- In some instances, anti-terror measures have impacted some communities negatively and inadvertently resulted in deepening social conflict and possibly increasing the drivers of extremism.

- Some politicians as well as extremist groups have been able to effectively mobilise around anti-gender-equal interpretations of issues such as inheritance laws, polygamy, divorce, alimony, and female genital mutilation (FGM).

- Veiling can be enforced through social pressure, threats of violence or outright violence. At the same time, it can make women targets of violence.

- Women’s use of the internet and social media is policed as it is often perceived as a route through which they might exercise greater freedom (i.e. to communicate with members of the opposite sex) and by extension, engage in licentious behavior.
In Indonesia:

- Education institutions are sites where extremist recruitment can occur. Campus-based extremist groups often target women students, offering greater status and position within their organizations in the beginning before women progress into ever tighter gendered control. They also redeploy the language of feminist struggle in their favour.

- Youth recruitment to extremist and violent extremist organisations is extensive, structured and has strong connections to various groups with extremist, Islamist and/or fundamentalist agendas.

- Although women overseas workers are often a hot-button issue for mainstream and extremist news sources alike, they also sometimes provide important economic resources to support extremist fighters across borders. Women’s monetary support for these so-called ‘just causes’ is supported by many of those in the study.

- Religious-backed male supremacy is increasingly used to justify a variety of gender inequalities, including coercive control and, in some cases, violence against women.

- Recruitment happens among both the impoverished and the educated middle classes.

- Social media activity amongst extremists and violent extremists is extremely gendered, with entirely separate spheres for men and women. Seemingly contradictory gendered messaging (i.e. the empowered woman, the vulnerable woman in need of protection and the sexualized woman available for the gratification of men, etc.) is used to target different audiences and is exploited by violent extremist groups.

- Like in Bangladesh, Islamist politicians and extremist groups have been able to effectively mobilise around anti-gender-equal interpretations of issues such as inheritance laws, polygamy, divorce, alimony, and female genital mutilation (FGM).

In the Philippines:

- The greater numbers of women entering the job market is perceived by some as exposing the family to instability and exposing children to the threat of violent extremism recruitment.

- Perceived opportunities for adventure, liberation and revenge attract men as well as those women who might want to challenge traditional gender norms (or at least escape some of the constraints imposed by such norms in their lives) to join or support violent extremist groups.

- Gender regressive ideology and practices taking place in extremist and violent extremist groups, aligning with their own personal views of such ideology and practices, plausibly motivates some people to support extremist and violent extremist organizations.
Policy implications

Gathering the empirical evidence and subsequently proving the strong link between support for violence against women, hostile sexism or misogyny, and violent extremism has significant ramifications for both preventing violent extremism and implementing the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. It is crucial for better understanding the systemic gender inequality and discrimination underlying radicalization to violence, the use of gender-based violence as a tactic of violent extremist groups, and the limited spaces for women’s participation in the countering and preventing violent extremism (P/CVE).

Hitherto, many of these factors have been overlooked, as policy and practice inadvertently marginalised women’s roles in violent extremist groups. Moreover, women were often perceived to have taken passive or supportive roles, rather than active positions, within these groups. Similarly, efforts to promote peaceful communities must avoid consigning women’s roles to the domestic sphere only, inadvertently in the process, undermining efforts to promote gender equality interventions and prevent violent extremism.

From a programming perspective, these findings suggest that any future P/CVE policy should be based on gender-sensitive analysis of the conditions that catalyze women and girls’ involvement in violent extremism. It also suggests that P/CVE programmes for female victims and perpetrators of violent extremism must be cognizant of the role of gender-based violence perpetrated by violent extremist groups. Finally, based on previous research by True et al. (2019), which found that women were less confident than men in participating in preventing violent extremism or knowing what to do to respond to warning signs of extremism and violent extremism, confidence-building exercises could be implemented through women’s empowerment programmes such as the one delivered by UN Women.
The common thread in violent extremism is often hostile sexism and misogyny. At some level, the relationship of some men to violence against women and extremist violence is intuitive, given research demonstrating patriarchal violence exists on a continuum—that is, committing one type of violence (i.e. in the domestic or private sphere), makes it more likely for an individual to commit violence on an escalating scale (i.e. more violence in the private sphere or public sphere). Scholars have pointed to the mutually constitutive nature of misogyny and conservative politics in violent right-wing groups (Cohen et al. 2018) and religious fundamentalist groups (Ji and Ibrahim 2007). Moreover, empirical studies have shown men who...
perpetrate physical violence against other men are more likely to perpetrate intimate partner violence (Ozer et al. 2004, Fleming et al. 2015). Anecdotal evidence has also shown this link across the world: from ‘lone wolf’ attackers in London (White et al., 2017), Nice (BBC News, 2016) and Orlando (Goldman, Warrick and Bearak 2016), to white supremacists (Bates 2015) that have bombed major sites in American cities, most have a history of domestic violence or grew up in homes that normalized gender-based control before engaging in terrorist activity.

Consequently, an emerging area of literature is increasingly focusing on the links between gender-based violence, gender inequality and extremist violence. The former is often a manifestation of unequal power relations within societies, and this is filtered through as gendered control within and outside of the household—that is, the enforcement, often with violence, of traditional patriarchal gender roles on everyone, and in particular, female members of the family. This, by extension, is used and exploited by violent extremist groups in their recruitment strategies, often making gender-based violence a harbinger—at least more so than other factors such as educational levels or age—of greater state and regional insecurity brought on by extremist violence.

At the same time, examples from around the world, including that of Islamic State, have demonstrated that women can be active members of violent extremist groups, even if they do so at lower rates (compared to men). Some studies have found that women can represent up to anywhere between 10 and 15 percent of a violent extremist group’s participation (Matfess and Warner, 2017; Brown 2011). Women play diverse roles within violent extremist organizations: they are often involved in recruitment, logistics, finances (including providing finances to violent extremist causes), and intelligence collection. They may also radicalize others within their families, or themselves be radicalized through marriage.

However, whilst marriage may be a crucial determinant for some women in declaring support for violent extremism, it is important to not deny women their own agency or depoliticize female violence. Instead, an analytical examination of the complex range of factors that lead women to support violent extremist groups that ultimately constrain their basic human rights and freedoms, is necessary. Conversely, it is important to achieve a more thorough understanding of how women counter and prevent violent extremism, and more generally, how gender identities and relations shape social attitudes and recruitment strategies by violent extremist groups.

This report closely examines why and how radicalization occurs from a gender perspective in three countries in Asia: Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines. In particular, it looks at the relationship between misogyny—or the fear and/or hatred of women—and support for violent extremism. The focus on gender identities and relations is important as it has implications for how violent extremist groups fashion and adapt their messaging to different groups of people to exploit underlying fears and garner maximum support. Moreover, most existing analyses focus on the causal factors between various social phenomena, such as poverty, education, age, state oppression or lack of voice and opportunity, and violent extremism. Such approaches explain individual motivations for involvement in extremist causes, but also miss the overarching gendered power dynamics that drive the spread of violent extremism. A concerted analysis of the continuum of control and private violence in the domestic sphere, to fear mongering and violence on a national or international scale, would allow policy makers to better understand the gendered drivers of extremist violence, and in doing so, make it possible to develop more effective programmes to prevent radicalization to violence.
Box 1: Background to UN Women – Monash GPS research project

This innovative research project draws from UN Women’s programme “Empowered Women, Peaceful communities,” funded by the Government of Japan in Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The research utilizes participatory and survey research methods to further explore the link between gender-based programming and preventing violent extremism, whilst examining some of the broader trends in the Asia Pacific region. The research seeks to provide an evidence base on qualitative and quantitative research on gender and perceptions and actions to prevent and counter violence extremism that will inform future programming of UN Women and other stakeholders concerned to harness new knowledge and approaches of addressing violent extremism in Asia.

As part of the research project, varying dimensions of gender and preventing violent extremism is examined, whilst providing an in-depth analysis of dimensions of intersectionality, such as age, religiosity and socio-economic status. Efforts are also made to assess potential or inferred association with rates of VAW or GBV and women’s sense of empowerment and efficacy at the community level. A comparative approach is used to assess different contexts in terms of their community processes, gender dynamics and outcomes in order to isolate the gendered differences in the nature of support and participation, as well as proximate push and pull factors and policy interventions that can potentially counter and prevent fundamentalist ideologies and by extension, violent extremism.
FRAMING THE RESEARCH: QUESTIONS, METHODS AND PARTICIPANTS

The research team employed grounded, interpretivist and feminist research methods, to foreground the voices of the research participants in examining the gender dynamics of violent extremism. The key research questions were:

1. How and why are societal gender identities and relations drivers of violent extremism, both enabling and countering ideological fundamentalism and political violence?

2. How are constructions of masculinity and femininity used by violent extremist groups to radicalise and recruit men and women, particularly in the Asia and Pacific region?
Several terms are used repetitively throughout this study. They include gender regressive, benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, gender complementarity, breadwinner masculinity and soldiering masculinity. The operational definitions of each for the purposes of this paper are defined below.

**Gender regressive** in this study describes how institutions, individuals, or laws may promote, uphold and implement sexist and misogynistic attitudes and practices, and gender inequitable norms that result in the reduction and limitation of gender justice (Vijeyarasa 2019). Individuals may hold gender regressive views and attitudes that collectively comprise a “gender regressive ideology.” Gender regressive contrasts with gender responsive or gender sensitive.

**Hostile sexism** is open antipathy or hatred towards women, or misogyny.

**Benevolent sexism** involves a “set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms of viewing women stereotypically and in restricted roles, but that are subjectively positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver) and also tend to elicit behaviors typically categorized as pro-social (e.g., helping) or intimacy-seeking (e.g., self-disclosure)” (Glick and Fiske 1996).

**Gender complementarity** holds that men and women have complementary, fixed roles with men typically the head of the family or household, the income earner and protector and women as nurturers who take care of the household work and the emotional care of its members.

**Breadwinner masculinity** refers to a model of masculinity in which men’s principal role in caring within a household is as breadwinner and provider (earner). Therefore, the widespread entry of women into the labor market could be seen (by extremists) as undermining male breadwinner ideology.

**Soldiering masculinity** refers to the image of warriors or fighters as the ultimate symbol of manhood or masculinity. Many have argued that the connection between militarism and masculinity (and by extension, violence) is the hegemonic form of masculinity. Violent extremists exploit this ideology.

### 2.1 Research sites

The research encompassed twelve sites across the three countries, taking in urban and rural locales, as well as areas with UN Women programming and those without.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>BANGLADESH</th>
<th>INDONESIA</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satkhira</td>
<td>Joypurhat</td>
<td>Dapok</td>
<td>Basilan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>BANGLADESH</th>
<th>INDONESIA</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>Klaten</td>
<td>Medan</td>
<td>Magindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>BANGLADESH</th>
<th>INDONESIA</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kushtia</td>
<td>Cirebon</td>
<td>Zambonga</td>
<td>Lamo del Sur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Non</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>BANGLADESH</th>
<th>INDONESIA</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joypurhat</td>
<td>Depok</td>
<td>Medan</td>
<td>Lamo del Sur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>BANGLADESH</th>
<th>INDONESIA</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dapok</td>
<td>Klaten</td>
<td>Medan</td>
<td>Lamo del Sur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the Philippines, qualitative research was conducted in four sites in the Southern part of the country: Basilan, Maguindanao, Zamboanga and Lanao del Sur. Basilan and Maguindanao are rural, whereas Zamboanga and Lanao del Sur are urban sites. All four sites are part of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), thus references to ‘the Philippines’ or ‘Filipino/a/s’ in this paper should be understood only to represent this autonomous region and not the entirety of the country. In Bangladesh, there were four qualitative research sites: Satkhira, Joypurhat, and two university sites; one independent university in Dhaka and one Islamic university in Kushtia. The focus on universities builds on the research in the previous project that suggested universities and education were areas of political action, recruitment, and resistance to violent extremism. In Indonesia, three of the qualitative research sites were in Java (Depok, Cirebon, Klaten) and one was in North Sumatra (Medan). Each of these areas is uniquely vulnerable, known to be at risk of violent extremism due to the occurrence of previous episodes of extremism.

2.2 Research design and analysis

The research utilizes a mixed-method approach, comprising qualitative research (focus group discussions [FGDs], key informant interviews [KIIs] and observations), a quantitative (survey analysis) study and online content analysis in Indonesia.

Semi-structured interviews: Two semi-structured question protocols were developed for the qualitative research. The same methodological guidelines were applied for all three country cases. Qualitative field research across all sites in the three country cases involved 94 FGDs, 32 KIIs and 22 community observations.

Survey design: In October and November 2018, the research team conducted a survey of 3,052 people (1479 women and 1527 men) across Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines. The survey questions examined social media use and religiosity and sought to measure self-reported levels of masculinity. Masculinity, sexism, and violence against women were considered part of the construction of gender identities, and therefore used as variables in the survey. Responses were on a five-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

Online content analysis in Indonesia: Quantitative and qualitative text analysis was used to examine websites (“sources”) of extremist and violent extremist groups in Indonesia. Each of the online sources examined have links to extremist or violent extremist groups (see table 2). Resource and data constraints meant that this work could only be carried out for Indonesian websites. The websites were sampled purposively from work discussing violent extremist, extremist, and fundamentalist groups in Indonesia (Wilson 2006, Wilson 2016, Rahman Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017, Hadiz 2013, IPAC 2015, 2018). Due to the increasing state control and blocking of such content, many websites are no longer accessible, though several were still online (IPAC 2018). Quantitative text analysis was used to establish major themes, common associations and associational concepts.
Finally, the analysis of the data involved bivariate regressions using the Pearson correlation coefficient ("r") to examine the strength and direction of the relationship between support for violent extremism and key variable thought to be of causal relevance: hostile and paternalist sexism, preference for male leadership, education, religiosity, gender, support for violence against women, support for practices harming women and girls, age and tendency towards hyper-masculinity. Ordered logit regression further enabled the researchers to explore the significance of bivariate analysis.

### 2.3 Field research participants

FGDs involved groups of only women, only men and mixed groups. Participants were selected to obtain a broad sweep of society, with many ordinary citizens, as well as civil society members, women’s group members, activists, LGBTQI participants and students. People with direct experiences of violent extremism were interviewed,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>No of pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrahman</td>
<td><a href="https://www.Arrahman.comw">https://www.Arrahman.comw</a></td>
<td>Set up in 2005 by someone with family connections with violent extremist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, and involved with its above ground branch, Majelis Mujahadeen Indonesia.</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kdi.wordpress</td>
<td><a href="https://kdiweb.wordpress.com/">https://kdiweb.wordpress.com/</a></td>
<td>Kabar Dunia Islam (KDI) (or Islamic World News) is the media wing of Islamic State in Indonesia, for a time run by a woman administrator, Siti Khadijah (IPAC 2015).</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslimdaily</td>
<td><a href="http://www.Muslimdaily.net/">http://www.Muslimdaily.net/</a></td>
<td>Started by the son of Abu Bakar Bashir, a Jemaah Islamiyah leader.</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voaislam</td>
<td><a href="http://www.voaislam.com/rubrik/muslimah">http://www.voaislam.com/rubrik/muslimah</a></td>
<td>Tabloid news website and providers of local jihadi news associated with the Arrahman and Muslimdaily sites (Jurnal Islam.com 2018). Banned by the Indonesian authorities.</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as well as a few members of extremist groups. Religious minorities and members of ultra-religious and moderate discussion groups also participated. KIIs in Indonesia included interlocutors from religious conservative and moderate groups, academics, and staff at the Indonesian NGO, Wahid Foundation. In the Philippines, key informants were chosen based on their knowledge and experience of violence, violent extremism and related gender issues and included religious and women’s rights experts, as well as staff from the Filipino NGO, The Moropreneur, Inc. (TMI). In Bangladesh, KIIs were held with eight participants, including women’s rights experts and staff from the NGO, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). Interviews with five women’s rights activists also provided context for issues related to gender and intolerance.

2.4 Methods through which key findings were obtained and outline

Three key findings underpin the richness and complexity of information that was garnered through FGDs and interviews as part of this research project. First, hostile sexism and support for violence against women are strongly associated with support for violent extremism. Ordered logit regression modeling of survey results found that in all three countries, people who support violence against women (that is, those who claimed that men are justified in using violence against women) are three times more likely to support violent extremism. Surprising and somewhat perplexing, in Bangladesh and Indonesia, the strength of this association is stronger and higher for women than for men. Second, no significant relationship was found between religiosity, age, gender and level of education achieved and support for violent extremism. Finally, misogyny and support for violence against women are important and overlooked factors in compelling some people, including women, to support violent extremism. In fact, misogyny (or hostile sexism) is correlated strongly with violence against women. And in turn, there is a significant, positive and moderate correlation between misogyny and support for violent extremism, as well as a significant, though weaker relationship between benevolent sexism (that is, adherence to traditional gender norms or values) and violent extremism.

Meanwhile, qualitative research revealed misogyny, gender stereotypes, and hegemonic masculinity to be integral to the ideology, political identity, recruitment strategy, operation and political economy of violent extremist groups. Various motivations and circumstances compel men and women to join these groups. Therefore, the remainder of this paper will turn to presenting the outcomes of both the qualitative study and survey results, to further elucidate how gender identities and relations at the societal level both enable and counter ideological fundamentalism. First, it will consider how gender identities and relations can act as drivers of violent extremism and thereafter, it will assess how constructions of masculinity and femininity are used by violent extremist groups to recruit and mobilize men and in particular, women. It will end with the key overall research findings and conclusions, largely drawn from the quantitative analysis (ordered logit regression) of the survey data, as well as some areas for further research in the future.
Several overarching themes were explored in the fieldwork including male leadership gender stereotypes and gender relations; women’s extremist participation, including their motivations for joining extremist groups; the impact of education and youth; the role of mothers and fathers, and gendered recruitment messaging. Specific questions related to an individual’s religiosity, masculinity, attitudes and behaviours relating to women and violence against women, and social media use. Responses to relevant questions in each of the three studied countries are provided below.
3.1 Male leadership, gender stereotypes and gender relations

The notion of exclusive male leadership in the public sphere was significant across all communities and is premised on very traditional beliefs regarding masculinity and femininity and traditional gender roles, as well as on a clear division of labour between men and women. Qualitative research further revealed clear links between gender identities (masculinities and femininities) and intolerance, violence and violent extremism.

In the Philippines, concepts of masculinity and of being a good father or a good husband are closely tied with financially providing for the family, being a protector and a leader:

*If I’m the breadwinner of the family, I would accept what they [violent extremist groups] will offer to me especially when you are not financially stable.*

This perception also held true in Bangladesh and Indonesia, where the ideology of male leadership in the public sphere was dominant across all communities. It was particularly strong in men-only FGDs in Indonesia where men stated that leadership was a prerogative of men. Both men and women also referred to religion to justify male political leadership. One man in Klaten, Indonesia stated,

*I would prefer male leaders because religion teaches us that men are leaders. In fact, no prophets are female. Thus, it is better if men are leaders.*

Women expressed this view less often. However, some religious women referred directly to religion as forbidding female leadership. One female member of a religious discussion group (*majelis taklim*) in Cirebon elaborated on the reasoning:

*It is not permitted. As long as the men are available, women should not hold leadership positions. Women can only lead if they lead women. Women cannot lead men. Sermons should be delivered by men since the voice of women is aurat [naked/genitalia]. Women should only give sermons to women, so that their sermon will not result in fitnah [slander/sedition/seduction].*

According to this belief, female leadership exposes women’s “nakedness” to men, creating in the process, a sin.
In Bangladesh, the limitation on women’s leadership opportunities, both in workplaces and in political spaces, was at least partly attributed to women’s lack of mobility. One young man raised the concern as a key barrier to women’s participation in politics, saying:

*Usually, if a woman works in a party [political or social organization] she may need to work until nightfall, which is a problem regarding safety and security. It is not suitable for a woman in the social context. I [as a man] can go anywhere, anytime, but a woman cannot.*

Therefore, when women wish to participate politically, they face approbation, violence, and risks.

Elsewhere, women were perceived as not having the inherent characteristics to enable them to lead. In the Philippines, femininity is associated with being “nurturing”, “motherly”, being a “good mother”, a woman giving “full support to her family and husband”, being “obedient”, “following” (rather than leading), being “emotional”, and also doing domestic chores. In Indonesia, men stereotyped women as broadly having fewer skills and talents for leadership, though some men admitted individual women had leadership skills. However, men generally expressed a preference for male leadership due to the stereotype of women being emotionally unstable and men being logical. Surprisingly, a majority of women across all four sites in Indonesia also consistently supported the idea of women as too emotional for leadership.

### 3.1.1 Pressure on men to provide for families can push them into extremist activity

As explained more fully in section 5, the gendered expectation that men must provide for their families can push some men towards violent extremism because violent extremist groups provide financial incentives. A man’s desire to provide for his family, a desire to belong or be part of a brotherhood, or a desire for sexual gratification were also mentioned as factors which motivate men to join violent extremist groups. Survey data showed that most people in the Philippines agreed that “men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives” (56 per cent) with only 16 per cent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing.
Figure 1.

Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives [Q37]

3.1.2 There is some support for women’s leadership in the Philippines and Indonesia

Support for male leadership of the public sphere was mixed, with significant gender differences in some places. For instance, qualitative and quantitative data suggested that most Filipino respondents in Mindanao consider women have the skills to make good leaders, and that a leadership role is not just for men. The survey material indicates broad support for women’s leadership in the Philippines, with around 56 per cent of people surveyed agreeing that women have the skills to lead the country, with more women than men supporting the notion of women’s leadership, and far more young people than older people supporting this idea do. Filipino women strongly supported female leadership in the political sphere (57 per cent), a much smaller group of men supported female political leadership (27 per cent). With even divisions, the slightly more popular view was men should lead religious communities, but whereas 43 per cent of men agreed or strongly agreed with male religious leadership, only 28 per cent of women did. Elsewhere in Indonesia, in line with greater participation of women in the public in Klaten, female religious leaders were even able to preach to male audiences in Klaten.
**Figure 2.**
The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men [Q35]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.**
The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men [Q34]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is also, however, a sizeable proportion of women (24 per cent) and, particularly, men (42 per cent) who believe that political leadership of a community should remain predominantly in the hands of men. Nonetheless, this is considerably less than those who have the same views in Indonesia (51 per cent men and 37 per cent women) and Bangladesh (50 per cent men and 42 per cent women).

### 3.2 Women’s violent extremist participation

In several countries, women’s participation in violent extremist groups has been extensive and visible. For instance, in the Philippines, several research participants reported on the roles of female combatants, called Mudjahida, and violent extremists:

> During the Zamboanga Siege, the sniper/top shooter was a woman, a wife of the commander. It goes like this: I must protect my husband and my husband will also be protecting me.¹⁴

Many research participants knew of women who were engaged in or supportive of violent extremist groups (as well as the critical role women play in preventing violent extremism). Research participants referred to women in violent extremist groups as “suicide bombers, combatants, snipers and spies,”¹⁵ as well as fulfilling support roles such as providing first aid or cooking for combatants, or engaging in public information and recruitment campaigns, particularly through the use of social media.¹⁶

Research has suggested that women play a key role as recruiters for violent extremist groups because of their physical appearance and ‘because of the way they talk; they are the ears and eyes, for communication purposes... and they know how to engage people in discussion.’¹⁷ They are particularly likely to be recruiters for other women as they can understand and play on their needs. For instance, one commentator from Bangladesh stated:

> In 2001, I saw a girl in Shyamnagar, Satkhira, walking with a laptop, she was going door to door to talk to the women and showing them religious videos.¹⁸

Women also play roles as couriers where men are unable to move around certain areas without raising suspicion.¹⁹ A commentator from Bangladesh pointed out that women are less likely to be checked by security forces on the street than men.²⁰

However, while participants frequently acknowledged seeing news reports of women’s involvement in violent extremist groups, they struggled to explain women’s motivations for joining these groups.²¹ Survey results from Bangladesh are split between those who think women are forced to join violent extremist groups by male relatives (42 per cent) and those who think women join of their own volition (36.26 per cent).²² In Indonesia, the proportions were almost reversed: 31 per cent of people thought women were forced to join by male authority figures and 43 per cent of respondents believed women joined violent extremist groups willingly. Finally, in the Philippines, survey results showed that nearly one third of male respondents agreed or strongly agreed that a man had forced a woman to join a violent extremist group compared with 25 per cent of women did.²³
By contrast, one third of all survey respondents (34 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that many women join violent extremist groups because they feel empowered to support what they see as a just cause.

Figure 4.
When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced to or pressured by male family members [Q48]

Additionally, several key themes or possible motivations emerged, each outlined below.

3.2.1 Marriage, wifely obedience and male authority
Several people related the coercive way in which some women may find themselves working in support of violent extremist groups, which would come as a result of gender norms that emphasise obedience in wives and daughters:

Both males and females are vulnerable. But for women, just think of a girl who has a father or husband believing in fundamentalism and the girl does not have information. These girls or women are more vulnerable as they cannot get out of the situation easily.
Although little is still understood about all the dynamics of marriage and membership in a violent extremist group, there is some evidence that it plays a significant role in the recruitment of both men and women. In Bangladesh, it is plausible that these groups provide support to members to get married, as the costs of marrying can be significant. In Indonesia, a number of participants in focus groups stated that women’s obedience to violent extremist husbands was a reason for their support of violent extremist groups. Many of the people in the focus groups expressed that wives ought to obey husbands in nearly all circumstances. This has important implications for women’s roles in violent extremist groups. For example, referring to the case of the Surabaya family bombings, a significant number of participants agreed that the woman suicide bomber could have been obeying her husband, “forced to do what she did”, and possibly subject to a longer-term indoctrination from her husband.27

Wifely devotion was also mentioned by some research participants as an element that violent extremist groups are able to exploit (because women are perceived to be “easily swayed”, or “easily convinced by their husbands”).28 A woman’s love for her children (needing to provide for them) or her husband (wanting to follow him, or at least fulfil the promises she made to follow him) were mentioned frequently as reasons for women becoming involved in violent extremist groups: One participant from the Philippines claimed: “we have learned from Marawi: women are pushed to join their partner out of love promises.”30 Moreover, the impression that ‘a good woman’ is one that joins a violent extremist group out of duty to her husband is a common one.

However, it should be noted that a significant number of women in FGDs (in Indonesia) avowed that if a husband was a terrorist, a wife no longer needed to obey: “There is a boundary of obeying the husband. Husbands can be said to be half-absolute to follow, but what must be understood is whether the husband’s actions are relevant or not with Islamic values”.31 Others said, “Harming other people is not good. Even though husbands lead their families, but they need to lead to a better path in accordance to religious teachings. No religion would ever allow us to harm other people. On the contrary, all religion teaches us about love and tolerance”.32

### 3.2.2 Pursuit of freedom and adventure

While most participants suggested that women follow their husbands out of love or duty, a few people suggested that some women who believe in gender equality also engage in violent extremist groups, believing they should be able to do what men can do and also equally thrive on the adventure and freedom it can bring. In such instances, it was perceived that women have an active, rather than just a supportive role, to play in violent extremist groups. In fact, the survey revealed that violent extremist groups enjoy significant support among women. A sizable proportion of women (19 per cent) said that they believe groups are justified in using violence if they are fighting for religious ideals, although men were more likely to espouse this belief (29 per cent).33

Many research participants further stated that women also seek belonging and adventure, and this can motivate some to join violent extremist groups. One research participant recalled how one young woman she knew joined a violent extremist group because she wanted to escape her parents who were very controlling, and find freedom.34 Elsewhere, a male research participant claimed that “holding gun is a sign of empowerment for women.”35 Two research participants also suggested that participation in gender equality seminars has emboldened (or ‘over powered’) those women to join violent extremist groups, believing they can now do what men can do.36
3.2.3 Poverty is an important driver for engagement with violent extremist groups

While men are expected to be the breadwinners within a household, poverty, exacerbated by the conflict in some instances, has meant that many women now must work full-time outside the home. Some research participants in the Philippines commented that women may also be recruited because of poverty, especially mothers, if they need to provide for their children. Indeed, poverty appears to be the main driver for violent extremism in the Philippines.37 As the later section on parents and preventing violent extremism suggests, the mother’s absence from the family home due to work obligations has been interpreted by some people as a factor driving children towards violent extremist groups.

Elsewhere in Indonesia, analysts Hadiz and Rahman Alamsya note that violent extremists appeal to concrete social circumstances—social displacements, socio-economic and systemic marginalization (Rahman Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017, 69). Notably absent from such analysis, however, is the role that gender inequalities and grievances might play in motivations, recruitment and mobilization of women to violent extremist groups. Studies of Indonesian women who had been in violent extremist or fundamentalist groups revealed that a desire for political change motivated them (Marcoes 2015, Nuraniyah 2018). Like men, these women were propelled by a sense of injustice in concrete social circumstance, including the state’s inability to mitigate high levels of poverty (Marcoes 2015).

3.2.4 Status and initial freedom within organizations

In Indonesia, research was able to identify that youth recruitment to extremist and violent extremist organisations was extensive, structured and had strong connections to various groups with extremist, Islamist and fundamentalist agendas. Crucially, research identified that women gain status and positions in university campus religious organizations, which rely heavily on their labour. But despite the increased prestige, as they progress within the organization, these women are subject to ever tighter gendered control and become exposed to more dogmatic doctrine. Thus, as women gain power and status in the organization, it exercises increasing control over female members contact with men, their sex lives, their clothes, and even their gaze.

3.3 Education as a site where gender norms are politicized

Education came up frequently as a site of contestation around gender norms, both in terms of its alleged impact on changing gender norms, as well as its importance in gender equality efforts. In Bangladesh, participants, especially younger participants, recognise these changing norms and link them to girls’ education. One young man stated:

In my experience, ten years ago, most people’s expectations were that a woman should stay at home and take care of the family. But things have changed now. On average, eighty per cent of the female population is working outside [sic].38 Female education is much improved. Many girls in our area go to other cities for study. So, you can say the tradition has changed.39
Universities are also a site for mobilization both for and against extremism and violent extremism. Mobilization occurs in a context of vibrant religious student movements in various political and ideological streams. For instance, in Indonesia, parts of the student movement comprise Islamist youth cadres, which manifest in political activism, religious activities, and in pop culture (Saefullah 2017). Participants in FGDs drew attention to the overlap of campus Islamists and political Islam, with many campus religious groups often affiliated with political parties. They also pointed out that some students join religious communities and cadres, forming campus communities with radical and intolerant views. For some young women, these types of organizations (such as Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKS) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in Indonesia) comprise “gateway groups,” which they learn from before moving on to more radical organizations such as Islamic State (IS).

Finally, greater education does not address all aspects of gender inequality. For instance, education was viewed as decreasing girls’ vulnerability to female genital mutilation (FGM), dowry, child marriage and honour killings, but this is not borne out in the data. Survey results from the Bangladesh sample showed that there is no relationship between support for these forms of violence against girls and a person’s education.40

3.3.1. Education has little effect on the gender division of labour

In Bangladesh, education level does not affect support for the gender division of labour. Field research shows that while education for girls/young women is seen as a positive by most participants, working outside the home is not. This is shaped by several factors, including expectations of a wife’s role after marriage, as well as the notion that a husband should be able to provide all that his wife and family needs. A significant number of young men did not want their wives to work. They justified this by referring to wives’ care obligations, to religious roles and expectations, and to women’s safety from sexual and gender-based violence.

3.3.2. Education institutions are sites where extremist recruitment can occur

In the Philippines, participants referred to the role of the Madrassa, Toril, the university, and Ushra (a study circle) as important sites where violent extremist recruitment occurs. There was a perception that students from devotional schools might be targeted. A young female Islamic leader claimed that violent extremist groups:

... prefer to recruit the students coming from the Islamic institution like the Islamic institution where I studied because we know what the importance of Jihad is.41

However, participants also recognised that not all those who are radicalised are educated. Moreover, educational establishments can be sites and sources of discourses that challenge extremist ideologies and offer critical or alternative discourses. Despite these apparently complex and conflicting drivers, there was broad agreement that those who are most vulnerable to being recruited or exploited by violent extremist groups were poor and young.
Some suggested seeking revenge for what they and their family have suffered, or wanting to rebel against their family, can also motivate youth to join violent extremist groups.

3.3.3. Campus based extremist groups target women students and redeploy the language of feminist struggle

In Indonesia, extremist group, HTI, targets women students and professionals explicitly and has been particularly successful among women students. It is estimated that more than half of HTI’s members are women (Nawab 2018, 101). This is supported but not confirmed by our qualitative data, wherein young women participants were targeted and joined conservative and Islamist groups on campus (The Jakarta Post 2018).

Extremist groups also tap into specific gender injustices to appeal to women. In the women-specific sections of the website Voaislam, the term fighter is most commonly paired with words like “Kartini” and “Raden” (the most famous Indonesian champion of women’s rights), and “emansipasi” (emancipation). The struggle here is not global conflicts, but of women’s rights. Interestingly however, Voaislam articles that feature this combination of word pairings try to paint the Indonesian national hero of the colonial era, Kartini, as a devout Muslim woman, whose image has been hijacked to make it seem like she was a champion of women’s rights (Voa-Islam.com 2017). Interestingly then, extremists re-deploy the language of feminist struggle to their cause of Dakwah (missionary work), creating a more devout society.

3.3.4. ‘Gender rules’ become stricter the longer a woman is a member of a campus group

Once recruited and promoted within the campus group structures, women face an accelerating pattern of gender regressive ideology and practice. For instance, one woman in Indonesia related the story of how as soon as she was promoted to a leadership position in the state university’s mosque, gender segregation was strictly enforced and control over her increased. Even in “Basic Leadership Training,” the emphasis was on gender regressive practices. She described how:

Basic Leadership Training relates to the rules that shall be implemented between men and women, such as not allowing handshakes between men and women, and how to dress appropriately. When there is a study group involving men and women there will nonetheless be a separation between them. Even looking at the shadows of a different gender through their clothing is prohibited.43

Thus, as women enter the campus Islamist organization, they acquire more prestige and responsibility; at the same time as they are subject to stricter application of the gender rules. In fact, there is little space in campus religious organisations for women’s leadership, although women make up a significant number of the regular members. Again, the ideology of male authority is strong.
3.4 The role of parents

This research explored the role of mothers and fathers in preventing violent extremism, building upon previous research conducted in Indonesia and Bangladesh (True et al. 2019), which demonstrated the often-overlooked importance of the role of parents and especially mothers in preventing violent extremism. While the locus of the discussion slightly differed in each country, most participants across all three countries continued to emphasize the crucial role of mothers in preventing violent extremism. This is because the majority of participants upheld traditional gender roles, wherein mothers are largely expected to provide care within the household more than fathers. Conversely, fathers are expected to largely work outside the home. As a result, mothers were perceived as being more proximate to—and by extension, have more influence on—their children.

In Bangladesh, being a ‘good father’ was associated with a man being able to provide for his family and support his children in particular ways, including through providing for their education. For instance, one young man claimed:

> In the old generation, fathers were not aware about education, but now fathers have become conscious about education. A significant change has come about the importance of education, ‘an illiterate father wants to make his son educated’. For example, I work as a construction labour, but I want my son to get educated.\(^{44}\)

In this way, ‘a good father’ is measured in the aspirational terms of ensuring socio-economic mobility for their children.

In Indonesia, the discussion centred more on the dichotomy between a ‘strong father’ and ‘caring father’, as well as between a ‘strong mother’ and ‘caring mother.’ Several participants declared a disciplinarian father, as the undisputed head of the family, would be the key to preventing violent extremism. A woman participant in Depok suggested, “Men are still the head of the family. Because most children are more obedient to their fathers. Fathers are the role model.”\(^{45}\) A male participant in Depok also linked preventing violent extremism to wifely obedience:

> Mothers have a greater influence in educating children. However, wives must obey their husbands, so it means that husbands have control over, and are responsible for, their children. Thus, husbands have bigger role in preventing children from being involved with extremism or terrorism.\(^{46}\)

Meanwhile, analysis of Indonesian survey responses showed overwhelming support for “strong fathers” in households. Most participants thought that strong fathers were important (27 per cent) or extremely important (59 per cent).\(^{47}\) Like our other case studies, even greater numbers of people strongly supported the notion of having a “caring father,” with 74 per cent naming a caring father as extremely important and 16 per cent claiming it was simply “important”.\(^{48}\) Men and women both supported strong and caring fathers to the same degree.
Many survey respondents felt that mothers were nevertheless the key to preventing violent extremism. While more women supported the notion of strong mothers (85 per cent) as compared to men (76 per cent), slightly more men supported the notion of a caring mother (90 per cent) than women (94 per cent). Decisively, 86 per cent of Indonesian respondents agreed or strongly agreed that mothers can watch for signs that a son might join a violent extremist group with no gender difference in the responses. When asked whether a strong father would stop his children becoming extremists, support was likewise strong; however, this view was stronger among men (72 per cent) than women (61 per cent). Similar to the 2017 results many respondents felt that mothers were more involved in their children’s lives, and children were more likely to confide in their mothers (True et al. 2019). Several religious figures and religious people suggested that the “mother is the first madrassah”, teaching her children the right version of religion.

Finally, field research conducted in the Philippines showed that while “good men” were also considered to be “good fathers,” mothers continue to be regarded by many participants as the primary factor affecting whether children are vulnerable or not to extremist ideologies. This is because many here also see the role of the mother as being critical to educating her children and teaching them right from wrong. These sentiments were notably prevalent among men:

*Mothers are responsible for educating as well as the formation of moral upbringing of the children. She can infuse values in her children whether good or negative, like hatred/anger and revenge.*

Most survey respondents from the sample (69 per cent) also agreed or strongly agreed that mothers can watch for signs that a son might join a violent extremist group, with slightly more women (72 per cent) than men (66 per cent) agreeing (see table 23). Most survey respondents (85 per cent) also agreed that it was important or extremely important to have a “strong mother” in a household. More women (90 per cent) than men (82 per cent) agreed with this statement. Even more respondents consider it important or extremely important to have a caring mother in the household (87 per cent), with only 3.67 per cent considering it to be not important or not important at all. Slightly more women (91 per cent) than men (84 per cent) agreed with this statement.
Many research participants were aware that violent extremist groups play on people’s weaknesses in order to recruit members, whether this is because they lack money or a sense of belonging, have been discriminated against (or feel their religious or ethnic group are being oppressed), or have suffered injustice and abuse. However, gender regressive politics also plays a significant role in helping violent extremist groups to recruit people, as notions of masculinity and femininity are often exploited by violent extremist groups. These messages are often compounded by rising resentment against government due to perceived injustices such as corruption, unemployment, and repression.
Violence and the promise of a sense of brotherhood, belonging and power attracted men in particular to violent extremist groups. For women, conflict dynamics can also make people vulnerable to recruitment. Ironically, a sense of insecurity can also sometimes drive membership in violent extremist groups as they claim to offer greater security or protection to members. Finally, social media content, including violent and intolerant imagery used to manipulate the viewer, as well as so-called ‘fake news’ (and peoples’ corresponding vulnerability to it) were deployed to attract new members. Each of these trends were evident in different.

4.1 Gender regressive attitudes permeate recruitment strategies

Survey analysis in some research locations indicate a baseline of gender regressive attitudes in the community, which in turn serves as the reason for continued ambivalence and resistance to changing gender roles in society. This has implications for how violent extremists are able to recruit women and men to their cause, whilst maligning efforts to achieve greater gender equality.

4.1.1 Violent extremist groups promote practices that harm women and girls online and offline

For example, one aspect of gender regressive ideology being a possible recruitment factor is extremist groups’ support for practices that harm women and girls, including child marriage, bride-price, and so-called honour-based violence, as well as more generalised support for, and practice of, polygamy and FGM. Rates of polygamy are quite low in Indonesia. The great majority of participants in FGDs did not support polygamy, although many knew someone in a polygamous relationship. There was tension in focus groups, however, between the idea that a male household head ought to decide on polygamy, and the notion that it was a woman’s choice. Women in microfinance groups believed that their earning power gave them more power to refuse polygamy.

According to some participants in FGDs, Islamist and extremist organisations endorse polygamy. A female student from Cirebon stated: “The teaching in LDK [university student association] is that polygamy is allowed. I, however, do not agree with polygamy”. Religion was used to justify the practice, as part of the Sunnah. Again, a woman from Cirebon said, “There is a Hadith which states that women who are available for polygamy will go to heaven. If, as a woman, we cannot get pregnant, then, yes, the husband can be polygamous.”

Polygamy has been an on-going concern of both Islamist groups in Indonesia (van Wichelen 2009) and ISIS (Lahoud 2018). In the online space, the word “poligami” (polygamy/more than one wife) is often paired with “perkawinan” (marriage), “praktik” (practice), “pro” (pro), and “mapan” (established) “hak” (right/the right), suggesting that discussions involve justifying the right to practice polygamy. An article in KDI argues that anyone (referring to a politician) who is against polygamy is ultimately going against the teachings of the Quran and cannot be considered a Muslim (KDIweb.wordpress.com 2014). Similarly, an article in women-specific Panjimas describes how an Indonesian actor and singer has come to change her mind about polygamy. According to the authors, the actor now says that to oppose polygamy is to oppose Allah (Panjimas.com 2015c).
4.1.2 Women’s use of the phone and Internet are policed

Another area in which gender regressive attitudes permeate practice relates to the use of social media or digital spaces. The use of social media is gender-specific, with one participant from Bangladesh explaining the gender norms behind this disparity:

*A girl does not get a smart phone if it is not that much emergency, whereas a boy gets it very easily. A family does not allow a girl to use gadgets to restrict them from having affairs.*

This is finding backed up in other empirical studies (UN Women 2018). Another participant recounted a chilling anecdote, blaming social media and technology for male sexual violence rather than men’s behaviour and gender norms:

*A girl from a poor family died five days ago in our area, as a result of mobile phone she had her fate like this. The girl was called by her so-called boyfriend to Satkhira for medical check-up. The doctor was not available in the chamber then a group of boys took her, and she was gang raped and then killed. We don’t know whether the poor father has managed to file a case. She was brutally tortured; those boys must have taken drugs before acting. That woman had a child. See what kind of thing ‘mobile’ is!*

Thus, attitudes to social media were mixed, and often negative. Many were suspicious of the sexual freedom and licentiousness associated with social media, particularly the possibility of women using mobile phones and social media to communicate with members of the opposite sex.

4.1.3 Demands for gender equality are sometimes equated with extremism

In some focus groups, gender equality was sometimes seen as a form of extremism. At least one women’s rights activist interviewed for the study in Bangladesh reiterated this view. A male participant, moreover, stated: “The girls are doing extreme things. Now we observe that girls have many boyfriends; they chat with different boys and have relationships with different boys in quick succession. These are bad practices”. One participant argued that fathers are also responsible for their daughters’ acts, “fathers who bought dresses for their daughters; they are supplying indecent dress for their daughters” Another activist stated: “[A] factor is perception of people around women and girls. Intolerance is increased, when someone is out of traditional practice, she is also accused as extremist,” showing the use of the ‘extremism’ label to denote women stepping outside the bounds of traditional feminine roles. Participant views in the qualitative field research provide some support for survey findings on the connection between sexist and misogynistic attitudes and violent extremism.
4.2 Notions of masculinity and femininity are exploited by violent extremists

Research has shown that notions of masculinity and femininity can be exploited by violent extremist groups to radicalise and recruit men and women. Specifically, violent extremist groups exploit the desire of men to be financial providers for their families, and the desire of women to be loyal or "obedient" to their husbands and other family members (fathers, brothers, others), in order to be regarded as a ‘real man’ or "a good Muslim wife", respectively:

The main reason why women join groups like ISIS or Abu Sayyaf Group is because they are related to the already recruited member of their family (either the spouse, father, brother or any relative).64

Around half of the Filipinos surveyed said that gender regressive ideology (women’s obedience, keeping women in the home) was not a reason men joined violent extremist groups.65 However, around 23 per cent of people agreed that it could be a reason for men joining, with more men (26 per cent) than women (19 per cent) supporting the idea. On the other hand, a significant number of Filipinos (44 per cent) were worried about religious fundamentalism impeding women’s rights, with around 22 per cent not worried about the gendered impacts of religious fundamentalism.

Figure 5.
I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights [Q54]
BUILDING A STRONGER EVIDENCE BASE: THE IMPACT OF GENDER IDENTITIES, NORMS AND RELATIONS ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM

4.2.1 Feminism is portrayed on extremist websites as rooted in capitalism and cause of moral decay

Elsewhere in Indonesia, articles on the website Panjimas, suggest that the figures on violence against women are doubtful, and that Indonesian feminists are wrong to seek the solution in feminism (Panjimas.com 2018b). In these sites, the prevalence of sexual violence is blamed on secular, democratic, and Western-inspired systems (Panjimas.com 2018c), further suggesting that the absence of religion within the daily lives of people in Indonesia has led to a moral decay and the rise in sexual assaults. An article in Voa-Islam takes a similar stance, and argues that the secular and capitalist system in Indonesia has led to the lack of Islamic education and ease of access to pornography and drugs, which in turn has increase the number of sexual assaults (Voa-Islam.com 2016).

Significantly, there is a strong anti-feminist sentiment in violent extremist websites. Firstly, equality between men and women is maligned (Panjimas.com 2015b). Secondly, gender and feminism are portrayed as concepts foreign to Indonesia and Islam, used by invaders (colonialists, capitalists). The association of women’s rights movements with foreigners and outsiders is negative, and according to the logic of defence of the religion against outsiders, feminism and gender are threats. Voa-Islam goes so far to exhort readers to “Save Women from Feminism and Capitalism” by resisting the Indonesian government’s focus on women’s economic empowerment, which is seen as a materialist endeavour (Voa-Islam.com 2018). The discussion of equality centres on how ‘Western’ notions of gender equality are not effective and runs counter to religious teachings (Voa-Islam.com 2018b). The sites seek to equate feminism with capitalism and colonialism. Indeed, one article on Panjimas blames feminism, and the oppression of women, on capitalism (Panjimas.com 2018e). Feminism as part of the “capitalist system” is blamed for the high levels of women migrant workers exposed to insecurity (Panjimas.com 2018f).

4.2.2 In place of feminism, extremist groups promote ‘gender complementarity’

In place of women’s empowerment in a feminist model, extremist groups’ websites promote gender complementarity, which holds that men and women have complementary, fixed roles with men typically the head of the family or household, the income earner and protector and women as the one who takes care of the household work and the emotional care of its members. At the same time, gender complementarity has widespread social salience. Most participants are supportive of and acknowledge sexist gender ideology and or gender complementarity. For instance, a few younger women also upheld the idea of men’s household leadership. For instance, a female student from Medan, a member of an Islamic student organization, criticized her mother’s insistence on independence in decision-making. Her fellow focus groups discussion participants disagreed with her when she said:

Gender equality exists in our society. However, it should not lead to a situation where women dominate men. Women must stay in her role as a mother, but also contribute to society. A woman must be able to give her opinion, so long as that opinion is positive.
It is plausible that religious fundamentalist and extremist groups tap into existing gender bias by projecting “equal but different” roles for women in order to mobilise both men and women to their cause. In the online space, women-specific sources are more likely to describe the “struggle” in the context of women’s rights, albeit being dismissive of any non-Islamic efforts. This suggests that while extremist groups do project a conservative view of women’s roles, they cannot afford to be openly hostile to women or the women’s movement. Thus, content on websites promotes gender relations that are complementary rather than openly hostile. This is a crucial finding, as it shows that extremist groups online must use different strategies to recruit women and engage their support.

It is also plausible that for a minority of people, gender regressive ideology motivates them to join an extremist group. However, half of the people surveyed (50 per cent) disagreed with the statement that: “Men join violent extremist groups because these groups support ideas like ‘women should be obedient to their husbands and women should prioritise their families, not paid work.” On the other hand, a significant minority of people (27 per cent) agreed that regressive gender ideology did motivate men to join violent extremist groups.Significantly, men in Indonesia recognized the attraction of gender regressive ideology in greater numbers. More men (32 per cent) than women (23 per cent) thought regressive gender ideology motivated men to join violent extremist groups.

4.3 Women who seek male protection from conflict can be recruited

In the Philippines, conflict dynamics play a key role in violent extremism recruitment and creates a vicious cycle that women are unable to escape. The exposure to a myriad of uncertainties, whether it is trauma, heightened and sustained levels of violence, the lack of hope for the future, or distrust or lack of confidence in the state and its institutions to protect them, may drive people to join violent extremist groups that promise protection. Conflict also often spurs poverty, which again increases the likelihood of people joining extremist groups.

The survey drew out that almost half of all respondents (47 per cent women and 42 per cent men) agree or strongly agree that women need a male guardian to ensure their security and protection. This perceived need for protection can be manipulated through the messaging of violent extremist groups if women are
alone or their husbands have joined violent extremist groups. Many spoke of violent extremist groups also threatening individuals if they didn’t join them and, of course, this threat extends to their families also:

...we have no choice sir. For now, we are safe, but when you leave, we are no longer safe. Because those who comes here, threatens us, they have guns, what can we do? We’ll just join them, like “if you cannot fight them, join them.”

4.4 Corruption, unemployment and a sense of unmet (economic) demands fuels resentment and incentivises extremist participation

Many of the responses to questions regarding recruitment and the vulnerability of young people focused on joblessness and other frustrations that stemmed from unemployment. However, participants also noted that vulnerability to recruitment messaging may not always be a socio-economic issue, as there are cases where wealthy individuals have committed extremist violence in Bangladesh. In 2018, this frustration led to the Quota reform movement, which demanded an end to public service employment for selected groups according to quotas. This reform movement was mentioned by a number of research participants at universities, who explained that the majority of the student body had been supportive of the reforms, but also that they felt frustration at the state’s negative reaction to their movement. As such, frustration relating to access to jobs is an area that inspires both grievances against the government as well as political organising to voice these grievances.

We see frustration increasing in the society. The student dreams for a good job after completing the study but in the job market they found enormous corruption. That makes the young generation frustrated.

Participants thought those seen to be missing out were predominantly young men, although women suffer a far greater rate of exclusion from paid employment in Bangladesh. A wider issue in Bangladesh also relates to difficulties in finding work post-education, and the corruption that has led to these difficulties. In one FGD, a parent highlighted the fact that many young men could not access work because of demands of bribes during the interview: “My son is educated but till did not get any job. He goes for the interviews and then there is a demand of bribe about twenty lac (~USD $23,810)” Conversely, this frustration can stem from unmet expectations of demands, needs or expectations of the State, and so is not solely related to joblessness. As one young man phrased it: “The highly educated can also be terrorists. If the government cannot satisfy their demands, they will take revenge.”
4.5 Recruiters exploit partial knowledge of religious teachings

Participants also mentioned ideology and false beliefs as part of a repertoire for recruitment, generally saying that people with strong religious beliefs are targeted, then brainwashed with false ideas about religion, “partial analysis” and violence.\(^81\) Most participants were adamant that a violent interpretation of religion that created terrorism, rather than religion itself. A key concern was that acts of terrorism harm the country itself, but also give Islam a bad name by association. Participants said: “There are both positive and negative sides of religion, but the extremists impose, in negativity more”,\(^82\) or, they explained that extremism occurs when there is both a lack of understanding of religious teachings, as well as other forces at play, such as this young woman from Dhaka:

> There are misinterpretations, fanatic attitude, and improper knowledge on religion. Because of religious illiteracy from childhood, people are easily misled into militancy. Incidents we saw recently were an organized act of brainwashing. These boys were recruited for fulfilling others’ goals.\(^83\)

4.6 The use of violent messaging to increase support for violent extremism is common

Social media was identified as having an influence on violent extremist activity. This connection was made clear in the survey results, even with on average low Internet use rates in Bangladesh, especially among women (UN Women 2018). Nearly a third of men (28 per cent) and 40 per cent of women reported seeing content inciting violent jihad often or extremely often.\(^84\) Digital space was also reported as being used to spread political messaging, religious intolerance, and extremism, including posts from Hefazat-E-Islam, claimed FGD participants in Bangladesh. As one participant explained, “The uses of social media is increasing, [intolerant/violent messaging] incident is also increasing. These are communicated by social media all the time and there is a regular brain wash”.\(^85\)

Social media content was also understood by participants to have an impact on the general feeling of a community and able to incite reactions from people within the community. One participant gave the example of content that showed experiences of Rohingya people: “Such postings ignite mass anger.”\(^86\) Another stated that videos can be vague but still incite anger: “Sometimes we found that unknown community just attacked the Muslim, or they broke the idols et cetera. That turned into riots.”\(^87\) Reporting on the suffering of Muslim refugees and war victims was used to increase support for violent extremist groups in Indonesia.
Similarly, in the Philippines, violent extremists use violent images and videos on social media to recruit possible future members. Violent images cited by research participants included beheading people opposing the views or beliefs of violent extremist groups, suicide bombings, killing of people of other faiths, burning alive hostages or refugees, and extreme torture. Participants also said that high-powered weaponry is purposefully shown to attract men. Some suggested that to attract women, women were shown bearing firearms and shouting *Allahu Akbar* to convey a message that women can be powerful like a man (as people sometimes associate empowerment with violence). Moreover, almost half of all survey respondents in the Philippines claimed that they often or extremely often saw intolerant content posted in social media (approximately the same proportion of men and women). A little over a third (32 per cent) said that they have often or extremely often seen social media content inciting violence towards religious minorities (again a similar proportion of men and women). Just over a quarter of survey respondents (28 per cent) said that they had seen social media content inciting violence against women and girls (slightly more women at 29 per cent compared with men at 27 per cent).
There were distinct similarities but also notable differences between Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines. The level of support for violent extremism in the Philippines is considerably higher than in Indonesia (men 16 per cent and women 16 per cent), and comparable with Bangladesh (27 per cent men and 23 per cent women), a finding that likely reflects the greater levels of extremist violence in both the Philippines and Bangladesh. Philippines is 10th highest on the Global Terrorism Index, Bangladesh ranked 25th and Indonesia is ranked 42nd (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018).
Figure 6.

*If groups are fighting for their religious ideals and way of life, they are justified in using violence, even if it breaks the law and injures civilians [Q46]*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic drivers of violent extremism were present across all the cases. In the Philippines in particular, while many research participants agreed that violent extremist groups play on people’s weaknesses, most agreed that extremists came from many different socio-economic backgrounds. There was a tension between the idea that violent extremist groups recruited those with limited education or knowledge, but a recognition that some of those engaged in violent extremist groups were also educated. Poverty and financial incentives were drivers, yet there was widespread recognition that many of those involved were middle class. Poverty, and the grievance it can cause as well as the opportunity it creates for exploitation, is clearly a driving factor behind recruitment to violent extremist groups. Indeed, this research has demonstrated that across the three Asian countries, there is a complexity of causes of and responses to violent extremism. Until now, what has received little attention are the gender dimensions of violent extremism and preventing violent extremism.

Variations in the traditional gender roles assigned to women, with space for negotiation of power, at least within the home, increasingly recognised in Philippines and Indonesia, in contrast to Bangladesh, are crucial in understanding the politics of supporting and preventing violent extremism. Shifting gender norms in the Philippines and Indonesia create opportunities for women (and men)
to prevent violent extremism. However, this has also been blamed across all three sites for rising violent extremism. In the Philippines, for instance, women’s entry into the job market is perceived by some as exposing the family to instability and exposing children to the threat of violent extremism recruitment without the mother’s moral guidance and close vigilance.

The role of the state was also very significant in Bangladesh (and the Philippines to an extent, less so in Indonesia), in which some people claimed the state enacted violence and anti-terror efforts that perversely impacted communities. A wider examination of militarisation and counter-terror measures and their gendered impacts across all three countries is however, beyond the scope of this study.

Social media was identified as research gap in the first iteration of research, and it was confirmed as an increasingly important mode of recruitment and movement building in both Indonesia and the Philippines. In Bangladesh and Indonesia, despite women’s lower incidence of Internet use, they identified online material as ‘incitement to jihad’ more frequently than men did. This indicates a possible intervention point in the online space in Indonesia and Bangladesh. Comparing online incitement to violent jihad with the other countries, Indonesia had a slightly lower score of 33 per cent of people reported seeing such content very or extremely often; this was lower in Philippines with only 20 per cent of people reporting that they have seen such content.

Not enough data was available from Bangladesh on this topic, due to a clampdown on Internet activity. In Indonesia, social media activity among extremist and violent extremist groups was shown to be extremely gendered. There were separate spheres for men and women. Moreover, gender regressive ideology including violence against women used to mobilise support. In the online spaces of recruitment, contradictory messages (the empowered woman, the vulnerable woman in need of protection, and the sexualised woman available for the gratification of men) highlight the complexity of gendered messaging. Evidently, seemingly contradictory gendered messaging is used to target different audiences and are exploited by violent extremist groups. Victimisation narratives feature in recruitment messaging, exploiting feelings of marginalisation and discrimination among both men and women. Contradictions and political mobilisation can also be exposed and leveraged by those seeking to counter or prevent violent extremism.

The Philippines case of women’s participation in violent extremism presents an interesting paradox, and potentially a curious tension managed by some violent extremist groups in the region, with traditional gender norms (dominant men, obedient women) attracting (predominantly) men, while at the same time perceived opportunities for adventure, liberation and revenge attracting men as well as those women who might want to challenge traditional gender norms (or at least escape some of the constraints imposed by such norms in their lives).

The Philippines case of women’s participation in violent extremism presents an interesting paradox, and potentially a curious tension managed by some violent extremist groups in the region, with traditional gender norms (dominant men, obedient women) attracting (predominantly) men, while at the same time perceived opportunities for adventure, liberation and revenge attracting men as well as those women who might want to challenge traditional gender norms (or at least escape some of the constraints imposed by such norms in their lives).

Male control over the public (political and religious) sphere was under challenge, and a hot-button issue for governments, populist movements and extremists alike in all three countries. Gender differences between men and women on leadership were significant across all three countries. Women agreed with male supremacy in leadership to a lesser degree, however, with a difference of 8 percentage points in Bangladesh, 14 percentage points less in Indonesia and 17 percentage points in the sample from the Philippines.
Overall, masculinity in all three countries is defined by male leadership and earning power, as well as violence and male protection of family and particularly female family members. While around half of both men and women agreed that men should sacrifice their wellbeing for their families in both Indonesia and the Philippines, this notion had significantly less support in Bangladesh, where gender norms of male breadwinner and female homemaker are more rigidly enforced. In Bangladesh, 53 per cent of women and 40 per cent of men disagreed with male self-sacrifice for the family. These gender differences had far less salience in Indonesia and the Philippines, where women supported male self-sacrifice strongly and to a similar extent as men.

Our results in Indonesia showed that in the deep structure of communities is a doctrine of male headship in private and public spheres—most often justified by referring to religion, although male headship is also codified in the 1974 Marriage Law (Republic of Indonesia 1974). Religious-backed male supremacy is increasingly used to justify a variety of gender inequalities, including coercive control and, in some cases, violence against women, a finding supported in other research on Indonesia (Eddyono 2018). Coercive control under the doctrine of male headship was present in women’s relationships with men belonging to violent extremism groups and can help to explain women committing acts of extremist violence. Gender regressive ideology and practices plausibly motivate some people to support extremist and violent extremist organisations, as we clarify below using quantitative analysis. In Bangladesh, the use of violence to force women out of the public sphere was a significant part of the way women’s behaviour and mobility was controlled (which was less prevalent in the Philippines and Indonesia). This violence against women in the public sphere leaves little room for women’s leadership or other public roles. In Bangladesh and Indonesia, Islamist politicians and extremist groups have been able to effectively mobilise around issues such as inheritance laws, polygamy, divorce, alimony, and FGM.

5.1. Support for violence against women increases the likelihood of support for violent extremism

Quantitative analysis of the survey data drills deeper into the nexus between support for violence against women and support for violent extremism. Our results show a positive and significant correlation between the variables “Supporting Violent Extremism” and “Supporting Violence Against Women” in the three countries and both genders. Variables consisted of single questions and groups of questions (scales). Among men there is a positive and strong relationship between “Supporting Violent Extremism” and “Supporting Violence Against Women” variables in Indonesia ($r = .5516, p<0.05$) and Philippines ($r = .5273, p<0.05$). For men in Bangladesh, the correlation between support for “Supporting Violence Against Women” and support for violent extremism is moderate at ($r = .3469, p<0.05$).

The results show that attitudes in support of violence against women explain more of the variation in support for violent extremism than other factors that we theorise might explain individual support of violent extremism, such as youth (UNESCO 2018, 2017, Chafar 2016, Cachalia, Salifu, and Ndung’u 2016, Bourekba 2017), education (UNESCO 2018, Mokbel 2017), socio-economic background (Hadiz 2008, 2013) or religiosity (Pedahzur 2013).
Figure 7.

Violence against women, hostile misogyny and benevolent sexism are better indicators of violent extremism than other variables.
Table 3: Generalized ordered logit model regression of relationship of strong support for violent extremism with ten independent variables

| Supporting violent extremism | Odds Ratio | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------|-----|-------------------|
| 1 - Strongly disagree        |           |           |       |     |                   |
| Hostile sexism               | 1.401     | 0.085     | 5.560 | 0.000 | 1.244 - 1.578     |
| Benevolent sexism            | 0.926     | 0.088     | -0.810| 0.419 | 0.768 - 1.116     |
| Support for violence against women | 3.015 | 0.209      | 15.930| 0.000 | 2.633 - 3.454     |
| Support for harmful practices against girls | 1.083 | 0.080      | 1.080 | 0.278 | 0.937 - 1.251     |
| Support for male leadership  | 0.918     | 0.053     | -1.460| 0.143 | 0.820 - 1.029     |
| Education                    | 0.984     | 0.061     | -0.250| 0.801 | 0.872 - 1.112     |
| Religiosity                  | 0.996     | 0.042     | -0.090| 0.930 | 0.917 - 1.082     |
| Gender                       | 1.224     | 0.101     | 2.440 | 0.015 | 1.041 - 1.439     |
| Age                          | 0.980     | 0.005     | -3.990| 0.000 | 0.970 - 0.990     |
| Masculinity scale            | 1.028     | 0.008     | 3.480 | 0.001 | 1.012 - 1.045     |
| Constant                     | 0.030     | 0.018     | -5.730| 0.000 | 0.009 - 0.098     |
| Supporting violent extremism      | Odds Ratio | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------|-----|-------------------|
| **2 - Disagree**                 |           |           |       |     |                   |
| Hostile sexist                   | 1.401     | 0.085     | 5.560 | 0.000 | 1.244 1.578       |
| Benevolent sexist                | 1.096     | 0.107     | 0.940 | 0.347 | 0.905 1.327       |
| Support for violence against women | 3.037     | 0.211     | 15.980| 0.000 | 2.650 3.480       |
| Support for harmful practices against girls | 1.121 | 0.087 | 1.480 | 0.139 | 0.964 1.305 |
| Support for male leadership      | 0.918     | 0.053     | -1.460| 0.143 | 0.820 1.029       |
| Education                        | 0.984     | 0.061     | -0.250| 0.801 | 0.872 1.112       |
| Religiosity                      | 0.996     | 0.042     | -0.090| 0.930 | 0.917 1.082       |
| Gender                           | 1.224     | 0.101     | 2.440 | 0.015 | 1.041 1.439       |
| Age                              | 0.984     | 0.005     | -3.080| 0.002 | 0.973 0.994       |
| Masculinity scale                | 1.053     | 0.009     | 6.150 | 0.000 | 1.036 1.071       |
| Constant                         | 0.003     | 0.002     | -9.120| 0.000 | 0.001 0.011       |
| **3 - Neutral**                  |           |           |       |     |                   |
| Hostile sexist                   | 1.401     | 0.085     | 5.560 | 0.000 | 1.244 1.578       |
| Benevolent sexist                | 1.723     | 0.189     | 4.970 | 0.000 | 1.390 2.135       |
| Support for violence against women | 1.781     | 0.135     | 7.630 | 0.000 | 1.536 2.065       |
| Support for harmful practices against girls | 1.456 | 0.131 | 4.180 | 0.000 | 1.221 1.736 |
| Support for male leadership      | 0.918     | 0.053     | -1.460| 0.143 | 0.820 1.029       |
| Education                        | 0.984     | 0.061     | -0.250| 0.801 | 0.872 1.112       |
| Religiosity                      | 0.996     | 0.042     | -0.090| 0.930 | 0.917 1.082       |
| Gender                           | 1.224     | 0.101     | 2.440 | 0.015 | 1.041 1.439       |
| Age                              | 0.987     | 0.006     | -1.990| 0.047 | 0.975 1.000       |
| Masculinity scale                | 1.081     | 0.011     | 7.680 | 0.000 | 1.060 1.103       |
| Constant                         | 0.000     | 0.000     | -12.900| 0.000 | 0.000 0.001       |
Quantitative analysis (ordered logit regression) further demonstrates that violence against women and violent extremism are strongly connected. Modelling several independent variables and controlling by country, shows that support for violence against women increases the likelihood of support for violent extremism. A one unit increase in the degree of “Supporting Violence Against Women” the odds of high “Supporting Violent Extremism” (5) versus the category 1 (lowest support) are 3.015 times greater, when the other variables in the model are held constant. Being willing to support violence against women translates into a person being three times more likely to support violent extremism. However, the relationship declines at a certain point. Those with the highest levels of support for violence against women support violent extremism, but those with low levels of support for violence against women do so less.

| Supporting violent extremism | Odds Ratio | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------|------|---------------------|
| 4 - Agree                   |           |           |       |      |                     |
| Hostile sexist              | 1.401     | 0.085     | 5.560 | 0.000| 1.244               |
| Benevolent sexist           | 1.510     | 0.204     | 3.040 | 0.002| 1.158               |
| Support for violence against women | 1.248 | 0.121     | 2.280 | 0.023| 1.032               |
| Support for harmful practices against girls | 1.359 | 0.154     | 2.700 | 0.007| 1.088               |
| Support for male leadership  | 0.918     | 0.053     | -1.460| 0.143| 0.820               |
| Education                   | 0.984     | 0.061     | -0.250| 0.801| 0.872               |
| Religiosity                 | 0.996     | 0.042     | -0.090| 0.930| 0.917               |
| Gender                      | 1.224     | 0.101     | 2.440 | 0.015| 1.041               |
| Age                         | 1.007     | 0.008     | 0.870 | 0.387| 0.991               |
| Masculinity scale           | 1.078     | 0.015     | 5.460 | 0.000| 1.049               |
| Constant                    | 0.000     | 0.000     | -12.080| 0.000| 0.000               |

Being willing to support violence against women translates into a person being three times more likely to support violent extremism.
The relationship of men to violence against women and extremist violence is already well-documented in previous research showing that violence exists on a continuum. There are gendered relationships between private violence, public violence and war and conflict (Caprioli 2000, True 2012). Surprising and noteworthy, however, was that women in certain contexts, who supported violence against women, also supported violent extremism. The strength of association between “Supporting Violent Extremism” and “Supporting Violence Against Women” for women is stronger and higher than for men in both Bangladesh ($r = .6412$, $p<0.05$) and Indonesia ($r = .5923$, $p<0.05$). However, this association for women in the Philippines is moderate ($r = .4599$, $p<0.05$), and women in the Philippines reject violence against women more emphatically and in greater numbers.\(^{31}\)

5.2. Violence against women likely plays a key role in violent extremist movements

The finding that women are complicit or support violence against themselves and/or other women, and that these women are more likely to support violent extremism speaks directly to the lacuna surrounding women’s roles as agents or victims. Gendered violence likely plays a role in women’s maintenance and transmission of extremist movements in ways researchers and practitioners do not yet understand. It is argued here that violence against women plays a role in the ideology, recruitment and support of violent extremist groups. However, further research is needed to investigate the correlation of women’s support of violence against women and violent extremism.

5.3. Misogynistic attitudes among women are strongly correlated with support for violent extremism

Support for violence against women is not only about support for violence, but also about sexism. Linked to the above results, modelling showed increased misogynistic attitudes among women are strongly correlated with support for violent extremism. There was a strong and positive correlation between women with hostile sexist attitudes and support for violent extremism in Bangladesh ($r = .5829$, $p<0.05$) and Indonesia ($r = .4687$, $p<0.05$). For Filipino women, this relationship was positive, but moderate ($r = .3268$, $p<0.05$). For men, the correlative relationship is moderate, not strong (around $r = .3$). Following the generalized ordered logit model, with a one unit increase on the hostile sexism scale, the odds of an individual’s high support (5) for violent extremism versus the other categories (4 to 1) are 1.401 greater. Hostile sexism is related to increased support for violent extremism for both men and women, but particularly for women.

In line with expectations and empirical work, women and men have different attitudes to women, and different levels of hostile sexism. The hypothesis that men and women will exhibit hostile and benevolent sexism in different degrees was supported in the data. As shown in the graph below, 32 per cent of women in Bangladesh placed in the bottom category (not hostile), double the number of men in that category (14 per cent). Also, in Bangladesh, nearly 21 per cent of men expressed misogynistic attitudes to women (21 per cent) compared to 14 per cent of women. Likewise, while 17 per cent of Filipino men could be categorised as hostile sexists, only 9 per cent of women exhibited hostile sexist attitudes.
Women across all three countries were more supportive of benevolent sexist attitudes (25 per cent of women in the very benevolent category) than they were of hostile sexist attitudes (10.7 per cent). However, men across all three countries exhibited greater levels of hostile sexism (24 per cent of men in the very hostile category) and benevolent sexism (34 per cent) than women.

**Figure 8.**
*Hostile sexist attitudes according to category, gender disaggregated*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong></td>
<td>16% 35% 40% 9%</td>
<td>8% 26% 49% 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td>24% 41% 26% 9%</td>
<td>15% 33% 24% 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bangladesh</strong></td>
<td>32% 30% 24% 14%</td>
<td>14% 34% 31% 21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with other studies of attitudes to violence against women (Flood and Pease 2009), our study showed significant gender differences with men more likely to support violence against women than women are likely. As expected, men in all three countries had greater support of men’s violence against women. The majority of women (77 per cent) in Indonesia disagreed with men’s use of violence against their wives, while a majority (63 per cent) of men also disagreed with men’s use of physical violence, there was a difference of 14 per centage points. In Philippines, the difference in anti-domestic violence views between men (48 per cent) and women (72 per cent) was greatest, with a difference of 24 percentage points.

Sexist attitudes aligned with support for violence against women. There was a strong and positive relationship between women with high scores on hostile sexism and support for violence against women. In other words, misogynistic women also supported violence against women. For men, hostile sexist attitudes were moderately correlated with support for violence against women in the Philippines and Indonesia, and strongly correlated in Bangladesh. The findings support other empirical work showing that men with sexist attitudes are also more likely to commit acts of violence against women (Flood and Pease 2009).
Between countries there was variation in attitudes to violence against women, as other cross-cultural comparisons have found (Nayak et al. 2003). In Bangladesh, for instance, 16 per cent of people strongly supported a man’s right to use physical violence against his wife, whereas only 6 per cent did so in Indonesia, and 5 per cent in the Philippines.

One area of concern amongst all countries was the significance of educational institutes for recruitment and a development of intolerance – particularly as many institutions or madrassa are not regulated and there is little oversight of what their curriculum entails. The research noted that public universities in Indonesia and Bangladesh were sites of recruitment for extremist groups, with women members crucial to the functioning of the extremist groups. The focus on youth in the research was a productive one. In Indonesia, research was able to identify that youth recruitment to extremist and violent extremist organisations was extensive, structured and had strong connections to various groups with extremist, Islamist and fundamentalist agendas. Crucially, research identified that as women gain status and positions in campus religious organizations—that rely heavily on their labour—these women progress into ever tighter gendered control.

5.4. Increased or decreased levels of education do not affect a person’s support for violent extremism or for violence against women

Increased or decreased levels of education do not affect a person’s support for violent extremism in our ordered logit regression modelling. For women in Bangladesh and Philippines, education does not have any significant relationship with the other variables included in the analysis. Exceptionally, for women in Indonesia, education has a significant, positive but extremely small correlation with hostile sexism and support for violence against women, suggesting that in the case of this study women with higher education may be embracing more conservative gender roles. This finding, though slight, is surprising and should be confirmed with further research. For men in all three countries, there is a significant, negative but, again, very small correlation between education and support for violence against women; that is, support for violence against women decreases when the education of men increases.

Given that the correlation for both men and women was so small, this is in line with other global studies that show education does not alter men’s and women’s attitudes to violence against women. We therefore conclude that support for violence against women is a greater predictor and may have a causal relationship to violent extremism.

Relatedly, being young did not increase the likelihood of supporting violent extremism, rather the model indicates the reverse is true. For every one-year increase in age (that is, as people get older), the odds of high support for violent extremism versus categories with low support for violent extremism (3 to 1) are 0.98 greater, given that all of the other variables in the model are held constant.

All three countries have also shown the role of religion to be crucial in violent extremist recruitment. Paradoxically, many participants argued a lack of religious knowledge or faith played into recruitment, however, many participants recognized that people were motivated for religious or ideological reasons. Of course, religious
and educational institutions also play a key role in preventing violent extremism. Religious institutions’ as well as affiliated youth groups, women’s groups, schools and prayer groups’ role in recruitment must be considered because they are places where many people frequent. Often those who might be particularly vulnerable are present in religious affiliated institutions, such as the orphans in Filipino Toril boarding school. Because of their age or because they seek solace, belonging or purpose in religion or, indeed, education, the vulnerable might be at higher risk. Religious institutions are also places where leaders can possess and can exert significant power. In and of themselves, neither religion nor education pose threats; it is those who seek to usurp their power and manipulate others that pose the threat.

5.5. There was no consistent link between levels of religiosity and support for violent extremism

Quantitative analysis supported the finding from the qualitative FDGs that there is no consistent link between levels of religiosity and support for violent extremism. Overall, our model finds support for violence against women, and hostile sexist attitudes are both better predictors of support for violent extremism than religiosity.

5.6. Mothers have a critical role in effective prevention of violent extremism, though fathers also play a vital, though sometimes overlooked, role

Finally, this research has shown the role of the mother is critical to effective preventing violent extremism. The case of the Philippines showed this especially clearly. Recognizing the role of the mother and her moral authority in the home should legitimise her engagement in community and broader societal matters when it comes to discussions on how to prevent and counter the threat posed by violent extremism. Hitherto, this has been overlooked as policy and practice inadvertently marginalised women into the domestic sphere recognising their important role as a mother in preventing violent extremism without considering a range of issues. Engagement with mothers must take into account women’s wider engagement, burdens, and capacities, and avoid excluding women who are not mothers. Participants reiterated a gender bias that violent extremism is fed by the apparent breakdown in traditional family life—a tradition reliant on a stay-at-home, ever-vigilante and self-sacrificial mother—and undermined by women’s paid work, especially overseas. Efforts to promote peaceful communities must avoid consigning women’s roles to the domestic sphere only and, inadvertently, undermine efforts to promote gender equality interventions. Not least because this can, in fact, increase the threat of violent extremism as well as other forms of insecurity. For, while the role of the mother at home was highly regarded by research participants, both male and female, many also saw the father’s role as equally important and were also advocates of the principle of gender equality. Analysis of the survey data supports this finding, especially because caring fathers tended to be slightly important than strong fathers.
Gathering the empirical evidence and subsequently proving the strong link between support for violence against women, misogyny, and violent extremism has significant ramifications for both preventing violent extremism and implementing the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Acknowledging this connection is crucial for better understanding the systemic gender inequality and discrimination underlying radicalization to violence, the use of gender-based violence as a tactic of violent extremist groups, and the limited spaces for women’s participation in the countering and preventing violent extremism. This analysis demonstrates that:

- It is important to fully understand women’s roles in violent extremist activity, as both victims and perpetrators. Women and girls can both be victims of gender-based violence, as well as fundraisers, recruiters and perpetrators of violent extremism.
There are cases where women themselves may support violence perpetrated against themselves or other women for a variety of reasons (i.e. ranging from their own protection to religious belief). The fact that these women are even more likely to support violent extremism in certain contexts suggests that there is a lack of understanding on the impacts of gendered violence on women’s roles within extremist groups.

Gender regressive attitudes, misogyny and ideas of male protection, as well as breadwinner and soldiering masculinities, play crucial roles in recruitment strategies and publicity campaigns of violent extremists. Crucially, these campaigns hold appeal for both men and women.

The role of the mother is critical to effective prevention of violent extremism. The case of the Philippines showed this especially clearly. Recognizing the role of the mother and her moral authority in the home should further legitimize her engagement and role in community-level and broader societal efforts aimed at preventing and countering the threat posed by violent extremism.

The father’s role is equally important in preventing violent extremism and must be explored more.

Hitherto, many of these factors have been overlooked, as policy and practice inadvertently marginalized women’s roles in violent extremist groups. Moreover, women were often perceived to have taken passive or supportive roles, rather than active positions, within these groups. Similarly, efforts to promote peaceful communities must avoid consigning women’s roles to the domestic sphere only, inadvertently in the process, undermining efforts to promote gender equality interventions and prevent violent extremism.

**Box 3: Areas of future research**

There are several lacunae in the literature involving gender and violent extremism. For example, little is known about the role of marriage in violent extremist recruitment, networking or financing strategies in Bangladesh. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that marriage—or at least the continued guarantee of a spouse as part of membership of a violent extremist group—may be used as a recruitment tool. However, little is understood on these issues, including the impact of dowry on the cycle of abuse and domestic violence, beyond the immediate headlines.

Additionally, examples of support by women themselves for gender regressive views, violence against women and violent extremism need further study. For example, in Bangladesh, the positive correlation between these three phenomena is stronger for women than they are for men. Thus, hostile sexist views in Bangladeshi women were strongly and positively correlated with support for violent extremism. Moreover, in Indonesia, for women in Indonesia, education has a significant, positive but small correlation with hostile sexism and support for violence against women. This requires further study to explain the causes of, and rationale for, these relationships.

Finally, the role of the state in controlling and monitoring people and political parties under the banner of anti-terror legislation in politically volatile environments has implications for women and violent extremist recruitment. This is also a little investigated phenomenon. The resulting insecurity generated from a government attempting to counter violent extremism may have particularly profound impacts on women (for example, when veiled women are targets for harassment in the name of security).
From a programming perspective, these findings suggest that any future P/CVE policy should be based on gender-sensitive analysis of the conditions that catalyze women and girls’ involvement in violent extremism. It also suggests that P/CVE programmes for female victims and perpetrators of violent extremism must be cognizant of the role of gender-based violence perpetrated by violent extremist groups. Finally, based on previous research by True et al. (2019), which found that women were less confident than men in participating in preventing violent extremism or knowing what to do to respond to warning signs of extremism and violent extremism, confidence-building exercises could be implemented through women’s empowerment programmes such as the one delivered by UN Women.
WORKS CITED

ACADEMIC LITERATURE


Glick, Peter, Susan T. Fiske, Antonio Mladinic, José L. Saiz, Dominic Abrams, Barbara Masser, Bolanle Adetoun, Johnstone E. Osagie, Adebowale Akande, Amos Alao, Barbara Annetje, Tineke M. Willemsen, Kettie Chipeta, Benoit Dardenne,


Vijeyarasa, Ramona. 2019. Gender Legislative Index Methodology Note: Measuring the Gender-Responsiveness of Domestic Laws Gender Legislative Index https://www.genderlawindex.org/

Williams, Richard. 2016.”Understanding and interpreting generalized ordered logit models”. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 40(1)


REPORTS


IPAC. 2015. Online Activism and Social Media Usage Among Indonesian Extremists. Jakarta.


NEWS REPORTS AND WEBSITES


Bates, Daniel, 2015. “EXCLUSIVE: Charleston killer Dylann Roff grew up in a fractured home where his ‘violent’ father beat his stepmother and hired a private detective to follow her when they split, she claims in court papers,” The Daily Mail, 19 June.


| Q2 | What is your age (in years)? |
| Q3 | What is your gender? - Selected Choice |
| Q3_1 | What is your gender? - Other |
| Q4 | What is your highest level of education? |
| Q5 | What is your religion? - Selected Choice |
| Q5_1 | What is your religion? - Other |
| Q6 | In general, how religious do you consider yourself to be? |
| Q7 | What kind of social media do you use? Select as many as apply. - Selected Choice |
| Q7_1 | What kind of social media do you use? Select as many as apply. - Other |
| Q8 | How often have you seen intolerant content posted in social media? |
| Q9 | How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting religious violence towards religious minorities? |
| Q10 | How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting religious violence towards ethnic minorities? |
| Q11 | How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting religious violence towards women and girls? |
| Q12 | How often have you seen violent extremist groups trying to recruit members through social media? |
| Q16 | Strong personality |
| Q17 | Dominant |
| Q18 | Assertive |
| Q19 | Defend own beliefs |
| Q21 | Forceful |
| Q22 | Aggressive |
| Q24 | Women seek to gain power by getting control over men. |
| Q26 | Women exaggerate problems they have with looking after the family. |
| Q27 | Women are too easily offended. |
| Q28 | Women’s rights activists are seeking for women to have more power than men. |
| Q29 | Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as sexual harassment. |
| Q30 | Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for |
Q31 It is generally safer not to trust women too much.
Q32 I am sure I get a raw deal from women in my life.
Q33 When I am in a group consisting of equal numbers of men and women and a woman dominates the conversation I feel uncomfortable.
Q34 The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
Q35 The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
Q36 Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.
Q37 Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.
Q38 Women tend to have a superior moral sensibility than men.
Q39 Women need a male guardian to ensure their safety and protection.
Q40 Women need a male guardian to protect their honour.
Q41 In a previous meeting in the community, we asked about her views on changing gender roles in the household. She said: I think women should manage the home and be responsible for raising the children. When we start joining politics, that just provokes men. How much do you agree with statement?
Q42 Another woman, had a different view to [ ]. She said: Women joining politics: That’s good. Women know how to manage households and families, and have education now to manage the country. How much do you agree with [ ] statement?
Q43 [ ] told us at a community meeting that some women working overseas sent money to groups fighting in Marawi and Syria. [ ] told us: I respect these women who sent money to support these fighters. Women can’t fight, but they can help support the fighters in these areas. How much do you agree with [ ] statement?
Q46 If groups are fighting for their religious ideals and way of life, they are justified in using violence, even if it breaks the law and injures civilians.
Q47 Men join violent extremist groups because these groups support ideas like women should be obedient to their husbands, and, women should prioritise their families, not paid work.
Q48 When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members or their religious leader.
Q49 When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they feel empowered to support what they see as a “just cause”
Q50 Young men join extremist groups to pay dowry, bride-price or to cover similar expenses associated with weddings and marriage.
Q53 I am worried about intolerance in my community.
Q54 I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women's rights (e.g. ability to work, voicing their opinion in public).
Q55 I am worried about violent extremism in my country.
Q58 How important is it to have a strong father in a household?
Q60 How important is it to have a caring father in the household?
Q59 How important is it to have a strong mother in a household?
Q62 How important is it to have a caring mother in a household?

Q63 A number of people suggested that the presence of a strong father in the household would prevent his children from joining VE groups. For instance, [ ] told us: If a father is strong, and rules his family well, then his children won’t disobey him and join a violent extremist group. How much do you agree with this statement?

Q63 Another group pointed towards the importance of having a caring mother in the household. For instance, [ ] told us: Caring mothers know where their children are, and can watch for signs a son might join a violent extremist group. How much do you agree with this statement?

Q64 Physical force between couples can be excused if it results from people getting so angry that they temporarily lose control.

Q67 Most women could leave a violent relationship if they really wanted to.

Q68 Women should always tell their husbands when they are going out.

Q69 A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him.

Q70 A husband would be entitled to use physical force if she doesn’t keep up with domestic chores, including looking after the children appropriately.

Q71 A husband would be entitled to use physical force if she goes out without telling him.

Q72 The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to.

Q73 A husband is entitled to use physical force if his wife refuses to have sex with him.

Q74 The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to.

Q75 A father is entitled to receive a bride-price for his daughter.

Q76 A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old.

Q77 Parents are entitled to circumcise their male children.

Q78 Parents are entitled to circumcise their female children.

Q79 If a daughter has a relationship with an unsuitable man, her father or brother is entitled to use physical force/violence to punish her for bringing dishonour on the family.
APPENDIX B: SURVEY SCALES

HOSTILE SEXISM SCALE
Q24. Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.
Q26. Women exaggerate problems they have with looking after the family.
Q27. Women are too easily offended.
Q28. Women's rights activists are seeking for women to have more power than men.
Q29. Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as sexual harassment.
Q30. Many women are actually seeking special favours, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favour them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality.”
Q31. It is generally safer not to trust women too much.
Q32. I am sure I get a raw deal from women in my life.

BENEVOLENT SEXISM SCALE
Q33. When I am in a group consisting of equal numbers of men and women and a woman dominates the conversation I feel uncomfortable.
Q34. The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
Q35. The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
Q36. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.
Q37. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.
Q38. Women tend to have a superior moral sensibility than men.
Q39. Women need a male guardian to ensure their safety and protection.
Q40. Women need a male guardian to protect their honour.

SUPPORTING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SCALE
Q 64. Physical force between couples can be excused if it results from people getting so angry that they temporarily lose control.
Q 69. A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him.
Q 70. A husband would be entitled to use physical force if she doesn’t keep up with domestic chores, including looking after the children appropriately.
Q 71. A husband would be entitled to use physical force if she goes out without telling him.
Q 72. The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to.
Q 73. A husband is entitled to use physical force if his wife refuses to have sex with him.
Q 79. If a daughter has a relationship with an unsuitable man, her father or brother is entitled to use physical force/violence to punish her for bringing dishonour on the family.
ITEMS MEASURING SUPPORT FOR PRACTICES THAT HARM WOMEN AND GIRLS

Q 68. Women should always tell their husbands when they are going out.
Q 75. A father is entitled to receive a bride-price for his daughter.
Q 76. A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old.
Q 78. Parents are entitled to circumcise their female children.

ENDNOTES

1. The WPS agenda comprises ten key resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. They are resolutions 1325 (2000); 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019).
2. The form of masculinity measured in the scale is “hegemonic.” There are multiple potential constructions of masculinity.
3. A full list of survey questions is provided in Appendix A.
5. Men only FGD (023) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018.
6. Key interview with a female undergraduate student (007) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018.
7. FGD with young men (043) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018.
8. Women-only FGD (064) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018.
10. Women only FGD (012) in Indonesia Cirebon, female members of Nahdlatul Ulama – October 2018
11. Q37: Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.
12. Q42: Women joining politics: that’s good. Women know how to manage households and families and have education now to manage the country. How much do you agree with the statement?
13. Q35. The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
14. FGD with young women (064) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018.
15. Women only FGD (066) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018.
20. FGD with young women (053) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University Dhaka, November 2018.
21. FGD with young women (061) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018.
22. Q48. When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members or their religious leader.
23. Q48: When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members or their religious leader.
24. Q49: When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they feel empowered to support what they see as a just cause.
26. Discussion with moderate, female undergraduate students (024) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018.
27. FGD with women in a women only koranic discussion group (025) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018.
29. FGD with young men (078) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018.
31. Women only FGD (015) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018.
32. Women only FGD (019) Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018.
33. Q46: If groups are fighting for their religious ideals and way of life, they are justified in using violence, even if it breaks the law and injures civilians.
34. FGD with mothers (080) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018.
37. Other research has also noted the role that poverty plays in insecurity in Philippines highlighting, for instance, the vicious circle of marginalisation, poverty and protracted violence in Mindanao (Conciliation Resources, 2015). Other research, however, comments that there is little empirical evidence to support the links between poverty and violent extremism (see Jones, 2018, for instance, although Jones does refer to the beliefs expressed by her research participants that poverty is a driver of violent extremism, as well as grey literature which highlights the links between armed violence and shadow economies in Philippines). Other research suggests poverty is not a key driving factor, at least in Mindanao, but rather factors such as ‘community marginalization, the social factors of revenge, and the gun culture that underlie persistent conflict in the region, and the lack of self-efficacy amongst certain young people’ (Casey and Pottebaum 2018, 13).
38. Official labour force participation rates for women over 15 in Bangladesh has risen over the past decade, but remains at only 33.07 per cent (2017) https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=BD.
39. FGD with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018.
40. The correlation between education and support for harmful practices was $r = -0.1211^*$ for men and $r = -0.1051^*$ in Bangladesh.
41. Key Interview with female Islamic youth leader (016) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018.
42. “The Mystery of the Dream of Kartini”
43. Mixed gender FGD (016) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018.
44. FGD with young men (034) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018.
45. FGD with married women (009) in Indonesia, Depok, October 2018.
46. Men only FGD (007) in Indonesia: Depok, October 2018.
47. Q 58. How important is it to have a strong father in a household?
48. Q 60. How important is it to have a caring father in the household?
49. Q 59. How important is it to have a strong mother in a household?; Q 62. How important is it to have a caring mother in a household?
50. Women only FGD (017) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018.
51. This was also reported in focus groups. For example, men only focus group discussion (067) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018.
52. Q59: How important is it to have a strong mother in a household?
53. Q62: How important is it to have a caring mother in a household?
54. Women only FGD (012) in Cirebon, Indonesia; female members of Nahdlatul Ulama, October 2018.
55. FGD with women in a microfinance group (011) Indonesia: Depok, October 2018.
56. Women only FGD (015) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018.
57. Women only FGD (017) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018.
58. “This Thaghut Servant Denies Polygamy”
60. FGD with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018.
61. FGD with young men in Community Action Group (037) in Bangladesh Satkhira, November 2018.
62. Women only FGD (036) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018
63. Key interview with a female CEDAW expert and NGO leader (023) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019
64. Key interview with a Moro Woman Leader (011) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018
65. Q54: I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights (e.g. ability to work, voicing their opinion in public).
66. “Equality that Does Not Guarantee Women’s Security and Glory”
67. “Women’s Sexual Violence: Real Proof of Non-Application of Islam Kaffah”
68. “Muslim Women Facing Modern World Challenges”
69. “Save women from feminism and capitalism”
70. “Feminism and the Reality for Ladies”
71. “Ladies, Your Career Is Not Only World-Wide”
72. Q47. “Men join violent extremist groups because these groups support ideas like women should be obedient to their husbands, and, women should prioritise their families, not paid work”
73. Q39: Women need a male guardian to ensure their safety and protection.
74. Mixed gender FGD with security sector workers (076) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018
75. The quotas in question involve appointments for 56 per cent of entry-level positions in government jobs. The quota means that those roles are allocated thus: 30 per cent to children and grandchildren of freedom fighters from the Bangladesh Liberation War (1971), 10% for women, 10 per cent to those coming from under-developed districts, 5 per cent for ethnic minorities/indigenous communities and 1 per cent for people with disabilities. The quota reform movement, which began in Dhaka University, asked for a reduction of the quota to 10 per cent overall.
76. FGD with young women (062) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018
77. FGD with young men (055) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018
78. FGD with young women (057) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018
79. FGD with young men (042) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018.
80. FGD with young men (034) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018.
81. FGD with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018.
82. FGD with young women (049b) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018.
83. FGD with young men (049c) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018.
84. Q77. How often have you seen social media content (eg. Post, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting violent jihad?
85. FGD with young women (054) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018
86. FGD with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018
87. FGD with young women (061) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018
88. Q8: How often have you seen intolerant content posted in social media?
89. Q9: How often have you seen social media content (e.g. Post, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting violence towards religious minorities?
90. Q11: How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting violence towards women and girls?
91. See Appendix B: Survey Scales.
92. Variables are described in Appendix B: Survey Scales.
93. 72 per cent of women in the Philippines strongly disagree that a husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him (Indonesia 64% and Bangladesh 44%)
94. Using the coefficient of determination (that is the proportion of variance in one variable that is explained statistically -not causally- by the other variable) we can verify that education in males only explains 1 per cent of the variation of support for violence against women in Bangladesh and 2 per cent in Indonesia and Philippines.
95. The WPS agenda comprises ten key resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. They are resolutions 1325 (2000); 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019).